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A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other 
points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously 
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose 
fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into 
parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to 
vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. 
 
James Madison, Federalist No. 10 
Introduction 
 On May 3, 2014, The Economist Magazine posed a provocative question: given the 
staggering amount of data that politicians have at their disposal, “how come their debates 
are so sterile?” The answer, at least according to the author of the article, is that politicians 
deal with data in a hyper-partisan way—praising results that support their ideological 
predispositions and ignoring or even denigrating those that do not. Unfortunately, the 
availability of more information does not “signal the start of a new Socratic age, in which 
the political classes jointly search for truth,” but rather gives partisan ideologues more 
“weapons with which to club [their] opposition.”1  
 The partisan exploitation of information in American politics is by no means a new 
development—look no further than the partisan press of the 19th century (or to virtually 
any politician in human history).2 However, the context within which this exploitation 
occurs has changed dramatically. Polarization pervades contemporary American politics3; 
and with the Internet, more people have access to more data (and spin) than ever before. 
For the idealist, these developments—a highly polarized political environment and 
unparalleled access to information—might seem incompatible. Individual citizens now 
have the ability to consider more data and more perspectives in forming their opinions than 
ever before. Shouldn’t they be able to determine when politicians are bending the truth? Or 
at the very least, ignoring important trade-offs and counter perspectives in presenting their 
arguments? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “When facts are weapons,” The Economist Magazine. 
2 Ladd, Why Americans Hate the Media and How it Matters, 22. 
3 At both the elite, see Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress; Noel, Political Ideologies and Political 
Parties in America; Fleisher and Bond, “The Shrinking Middle in the US Congress”; and Shor and McCarty, 
“The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures,” and the mass level, see Abramowitz, The 
Disappearing Center; Levendusky, The Partisan Sort; and Hetherington and Rudolph, Why Washington 
Won’t Work, partisans are more polarized than at any time in the past century. 
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 The Information Age appears to provide so much potential for people to form 
political beliefs backed by data—and to consistently improve those beliefs through 
exposure to the perspectives of others. But, even a quick look around suggests this 
potential is being continuously squandered. This project investigates why. In fact, in a 
polarized political climate (as the Economist article mentioned above suggests), it might be 
the case that information matters even less. I hope that exploring these questions will 
enable me to reflect on my own relationship with information in politics and to make 
suggestions as to how individuals should navigate the contemporary media environment in 
the context of a political discourse often defined by partisan polarization 
 
The Deliberative Ideal For Information Processing 
 How should citizens engage with political information? In a perfect world, we’d all 
be deliberative.4 We’d carefully review arguments from all sides of an issue, evenhandedly 
evaluate the evidence that supports those arguments, and choose a position after 
considering the trade-offs necessitated by it. Deliberation—whether individual or with 
others through discussion—must meet at least two conditions: It requires exposure to a 
wide variety of political perspectives and arguments; and for this exposure to matter 
individuals must approach arguments, evidence, and others with an open-mind. In the 
abstract, these conditions are relatively uncontroversial. They are just another way to 
define the concept of critical thinking. But, what deliberation looks like in practice is less 
clear. 
 James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin define the deliberative ideal as a “weighing 
of competing considerations” that is informed, balanced, conscientious, substantive, and 
comprehensive.5 Three preconditions—informed, balanced, and comprehensive—roughly 
map to the exposure requirement. Arguments need to be backed by “appropriate and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There are some who contest this standard on the grounds that it sets the bar too high for individuals, who 
have limited time and attention spans. See Zaller, “A New Standard for News Quality.” Others contend that it 
is not rational for citizens to incur the costs necessary to sort through political information; instead, most 
people maximize utility by spending time and energy on their careers and families. See Downs, “An 
Economic Theory of Political Action in Democracy.” Yet others contend that deliberation comes with its 
own assumptions. This is an argument that “rationality itself rests on [beliefs]” that are not necessarily 
superior to the ones that underlie other value systems used to form beliefs, like religious fundamentalism. See 
Fish, “Liberalism Doesn’t Exist,” 997. 
5 Fishkin and Luskin, “Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal,” 285. 
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reasonably accurate factual claims”; “met by contrary arguments”; and representative of 
“all points of view held by significant portions of the population.”6 Mere exposure to 
“oppositional political perspectives,” however, does not mean much if individuals don’t 
deal with uncomfortable information in good faith. Thus, this exposure is only “one 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition in almost all definitions of deliberation.”7 To 
approach arguments in good faith, individuals must be conscientious—“willing to talk and 
listen, with civility and respect”—and must care about the substance of the arguments 
advanced rather than “how they are made or who is making them.”8 Both attributes are 
essential to the very definition of open-mindedness. 
 Fishkin and Luskin’s definition clarifies one of the main objectives of deliberation: 
to help individuals form more accurate beliefs by learning from each other. As John Stuart 
Mill famously asserted in defense of free speech: 
 [T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is 
 robbing…those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If 
 the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for 
 truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception 
 and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.9 
So long as individuals care about the quality of their beliefs, they should also care about 
exposure to alternative perspectives and by extension the potential for this exposure to 
provide an opportunity to learn. 
 The value of the deliberative ideal extends far beyond this individual accuracy goal. 
Many scholars argue that deliberation provides legitimacy for the democratic system.10 At 
a minimum, understanding the reasons that justify the government’s actions reduces the 
likelihood that people view those actions as an arbitrary abuse of power: “Most 
fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions made by 
citizens and their representatives.”11 When politicians and citizens alike deliberate about 
politics—or take part in what Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Bruce W. Hardy call “civil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 
7 Mutz, Hearing the Other Side, 6. 
8 Fishkin and Luskin, “Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal,” 285. 
9 Mill, On Liberty, 87. 
10 Manin, Stein, and Mansbridge, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation.” 
11 Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 3. 
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engaged argument”12— “norms are honored, areas of agreement and disagreement are 
clarified, the collective understanding of the issue at hand is advanced, the commitments of 
participants to the legitimacy of the system is reinforced, and judgment is based on 
reasoned argument and not prejudice, force, or fear.”13 
 In theory, deliberative democracy sounds great. However, it is reasonable to ask 
whether deliberative democratic theorists live in the same world we do. The ideal that they 
outline appears on its face so far removed from the world of politics in which we currently 
live. Some even argue that deliberation is virtually impossible if we want people to 
participate in politics.14 In reality, people rarely spend the amount of time and energy 
deliberation necessitates; and, as this project will later demonstrate, they have a large 
number of underlying (and uncontrollable) psychological tendencies that make deliberation 
extraordinarily difficult. 
 Despite these difficulties, deliberative information processing functions well as an 
ideal. Although it can never be reached, each of us can certainly have a more or less 
deliberative relationship with political information. With that ideal in mind, this project 
will explore how polarization affects the quality of individuals’ belief formation processes. 
Quality, defined broadly, is the extent to which those processes reflect the deliberative 
ideal outlined above. Ultimately, if people want to form “better” political beliefs, how 
should they rethink their own consumption of political information in an age of 
polarization? 
 
The Role of the Media in Promoting Deliberation 
 Today’s diverse media environment empowers individuals with more choice over 
how they get political information than ever before. Unlike the mid-20th century, the 
“media” is no longer predominantly the domain of broadcast and newspaper journalists. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Civil engaged argument shares important similarities with Fishkin and Luskin’s formulation of 
deliberation. Jamieson and Hardy define civil engaged argument as follows: “The rules of argument include 
the notions that assertions should be backed by relevant evidence that constitutes proof, the fairness and 
accuracy of evidence should be subject to scrutiny, the testimony of those who are self-interested should be 
suspect, evidence must not be ripped from its context, relevant evidence must be disclosed and not 
suppressed, like items should be compared to like items, and a plan should be tested by asking whether it 
meets the need and whether its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.” Jamieson and Hardy, “What is Civil 
Engaged Argument and Why Does Aspiring to it Matter?” 29.  
13 Ibid., 30. 
14 Mutz, Hearing the Other Side. 
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With the rise of ideologically slanted opinion programs like those on FOX News and 
MSNBC, online publications like Breitbart and The Huffington Post, and talk radio, the 
politically engaged individual can now sample from one or many partisan sources. With 
the emergence of social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, people can now 
consume political information socially: they can discuss political news articles, comment 
on political television segments, and even interact with the (albeit somewhat indirect) 
political communication of politicians, journalists, and public figures. 
 Any standard set for the media must recognize this fragmentation of the 
information environment. Thus, I follow Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Bruce W. Hardy, and 
Daniel Romer when, writing in 2007, they argue that normative theories of the press 
should distinguish the “detached” from the “partisan” media15; and James Curran, who 
writes in 2005: “There should be a division of labor in which different sectors of the media 
have different roles, practice different forms of journalism, and make different 
contributions to the functioning of the democratic system.”16 Since 2007, technological 
change has necessitated a third category: social media. 
 What types of media does each category—“detached,” “partisan,” and “social”—
include, and what role does each play in promoting deliberation? The detached media 
consists of what many would think of as traditional news sources: newspapers like the New 
York Times and the Wall Street Journal and the major news networks like CBS and NBC. 
This type of media subscribes to the journalistic norm of objectivity. It attempts to present 
all sides of an issue without displaying a preference for one side or another. As James 
Curran writes, “balanced media report ‘multiple truths’ advanced by rival 
spokespersons.”17 By “enabling divergent viewpoints and interests to be aired in reciprocal 
debate” its “central democratic purpose is…to mediate between social groups, rather than 
to champion exclusively one group and set of concerns.”18 In other words, “objective” 
reporting functions to forge consensus in a politically fragmented society. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Jamieson, Hardy, and Romer, “The Effectiveness of the Press in Serving the Needs of American 
Democracy,” 27-28. 
16 Curran, “What Democracy Requires of the Media,” 128. 
17 Ibid.,130. 
18 Ibid., 124. 
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 But as much as we tend to “valorize consensus,”19 sometimes mainstream 
agreement only means that the media have ignored important minority viewpoints. In this 
view, trying to be objective “can lead journalists to rely on established power holders… as 
sources of news and comment, and unconsciously internalize assumptions that are 
“uncontroversial” within the prevailing framework of thought.”20 In order to bring 
minority perspectives to the fore, American democracy also requires a partisan media. 
Bloggers, talk radio hosts, the highly partisan opinion segments on FOX News and 
MSNBC, and partisan news organizations like the Huffington Post and Breitbart can (at 
times) serve an important purpose. Even though the “partisan media are essentially 
propagandistic, advancing at best partial truths,”21 they are almost existentially disposed to 
criticize and question the detached or “mainstream” media. Thus, the partisan media bring 
arguments that might otherwise be ignored in the traditional media into the public 
discourse. 
 With the detached and partisan media playing distinct roles, “the media system” 
can “simultaneously promote conflict and conciliation.”22 The Internet, social media in 
particular, ought to facilitate deliberation too. Because it gives individuals access to more 
information—from both detached and partisan outlets—and the ability to discuss that 
information with an almost infinite number of other people, who come from varied 
perspectives, it ought to be much easier for individuals to approximate the deliberative 
ideal. 
 Those who promote a model of democracy based on deliberation argue that the 
media ought to nurture a public that is “alert, informed, and active in order to supervise the 
conduct of government.” It should encourage debate—and this debate should enable 
citizens to “become aware of other viewpoints and interests, register complexity, explore 
common ground and differences, consider alternative options, and become willing to 
contemplate tradeoffs.”23 In this account, the normative role of “the media” writ large is 
clear: the synergy between the “detached,” “partisan,” and “social” media should create a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Selinger, “Putting Polarization in Historical Perspective,” 24. 
20 Curran, “What Democracy Requires of the Media,” 126. 
21 Ibid., 130. 
22 Ibid., 128. 
23 Ibid., 132. 
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marketplace of ideas—“where ideas battle for supremacy on the basis of merit, and where 
a reason-based consensus emerges that guides the public direction of society.”24 
 It is worth briefly questioning whether and to what extent this marketplace of ideas 
standard works as a normative conception of the media. While most scholars agree that 
American democracy would greatly benefit if the media environment fostered a true 
marketplace of ideas, some argue that this standard places too high a burden on individual 
citizens. Scholarly disagreement is ultimately rooted in different conceptions of 
democracy. According to Curran, those who utilize this marketplace of ideas standard 
subscribe to a “deliberative” model of democracy (outlined above) while those who don’t 
usually endorse a “pragmatic” model.  
 John Zaller in particular takes a pragmatic view. Instead of judging the quality of 
the media by its ability to “provide citizens with the basic information necessary to form 
and update opinions on all of the major issues of the day,”25 it should function more like a 
“burglar alarm,” calling attention to the most important issues with “intensely focused, 
dramatic, and entertaining” coverage.26 This type of coverage would engage the average 
citizen and would provide him enough information necessary to hold his public official 
accountable.  
 But despite their criticism, many who support this pragmatic approach still 
advocate deliberation for the most active citizens. Thus, rather than rejecting the 
deliberative model outright, Zaller and others advocate a two-tiered standard: Pragmatic 
democracy “implicitly endorses a basic news service for the majority, and a fuller news 
service for a self-selecting minority involved in government, political activism, and civil 
society.”27 
 When it comes to media’s role in informing the public, Thomas Patterson and 
Philip Seib don’t fall into either of Curran’s categories. On the one hand, their ideal seems 
to echo a lot of the deliberative one: In their model, “critical thinking occurs in the context 
of interests, values, beliefs, understandings, or principles. New information is weighed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 126. 
25 Zaller, “A New Standard of News Quality,” 110. 
26 Ibid., 122. 
27 Curran, “What Democracy Requires of the Media,” 132. 
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against existing positions, perceptions, or biases.”28 Rather than the amount of facts a 
citizen can accurately recall about politics, informed citizens should be judged by the 
extent to which an individual has “an inquiring mind.”29 On the other hand, they argue that 
we should not demand that the media be responsible for creating “inquiring minds”; 
instead, “if the informed citizenship is a habit of mind,” they “first emphasize the 
contribution of families and schools.”30 
 At least for the most active citizens, all of these standards fall in line with the 
deliberative ideal for information processing that I outlined earlier. The media should 
function as a marketplace of ideas because it must provide citizens with the information 
necessary to hold their public officials accountable. Ultimately, it “must present a credible 
threat to deter politicians from lying with impunity.”31 As Joseph Pulitzer wrote in 1878, 
“more crime, immorality and rascality is prevented by the fear of exposure in the 
newspapers than by all laws, moral and statute, ever devised.”32 
 
Outline of Thesis 
 How can individuals in the contemporary media and political environment form 
better political beliefs? That (perhaps naively ambitious) question motivates this project. 
Answering it requires weaving together three distinct but interrelated literatures—on 
polarization, political psychology, and the media. It requires fundamentally rethinking how 
individuals consume political information. 
 My paper will consist of three chapters. In chapter one, I describe the polarized 
political context within which those who are most interested and most engaged in politics 
find themselves immersed. This chapter considers what it means to say American politics 
is polarized. It evaluates the extent of polarization in American politics. And it presents 
original evidence that suggests that just as the public and members of Congress have 
polarized, so too has American political discourse. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Patterson and Seib, “Informing the Public,” 190. 
29 This standard explicitly recognizes the limits of the human mind: “Once a judgment is reached, much of 
the information that contributes to it is disgorged. The judgment is retained but most of the raw material that 
went into it is not.” Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 191. 
31 Bennett and Serrin, “The Watchdog Rule,” 172. 
32 Ibid. 
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 In chapter two, I enter the world of political psychology to investigate how 
America’s polarized politics has influenced the quality of individuals’ beliefs. More 
specifically, this chapter focuses on the tendency of affectively polarized partisans to 
engage in selective exposure and motivated reasoning. 
 In chapter three, I explore the role that the media plays in encouraging or 
minimizing these biased information processing practices. This chapter argues that social 
media—compared with the detached and partisan forms—provides the greatest hope of 
moving individuals closer to the deliberative ideal.  It also presents original evidence that 
suggests that people remain more open minded when a friend presents a political argument 
to them than when a politician does. 
 Drawing from the literatures outlined in the first three chapters, how can each of us 
help increase the influence of facts relative to that of factions in America’s political 
discourse? In the conclusion, I argue that individuals need to fundamentally rethink how 
they consume political information; advocate for the creation of a completely new social 
media platform specifically designed to encourage political deliberation; and outline what 
such a platform might look like. By reimagining the relationship between citizens and 
political information and more effectively harnessing the power that the Information Age 
provides, I argue that we can trade our sterile, partisan, and polarized political discourse 
for a much more deliberative one—in sum, one that better approximates a marketplace of 
ideas. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   10	  
Chapter One: Is American Politics Polarized? 
 
 Pundits love to talk about polarization. Rarely, however, do they clearly define 
what “polarization” means. Often, this lack of rigor can lead to significant misperceptions 
about the state of American politics.33 In this chapter, I set out to explain what it means to 
say American politics is polarized and what the evidence in the political science literature 
suggests about the nature of polarization in American politics. First, I present a variety of 
different definitions for polarization. The vast majority of scholarly disagreement stems 
from not getting these definitions straight. Second, after clarifying the meaning of 
polarization, I assess the extent of polarization in American politics at both the elite and 
mass level. At the end of this chapter, I present empirical evidence that demonstrates that 
as elites in Congress have become polarized so too has America’s political discourse. 
 
Defining Polarization 
 What is political polarization? When people are ‘polarized,’ they are “characterized 
by division into opposing groups.”34 Polarization of the political variety takes a number of 
forms. For example, it might be strictly emotional: Republicans hate Democrats or vice-
versa. It might be primarily over an individual issue: in the mid 19th century, slavery pit 
Northern against Southern States. Or it might be ideological: over a wide range of issues, 
conservatives fundamentally disagree with liberals. 
 Each of these examples implies that polarization is more or less synonymous with a 
state of inter-group-disagreement. But, “polarization is both a state and a process.”35 In 
other words, we can, like the examples above, refer to polarization at a given point in time: 
how much does group X disagree with group Y relative to how much they could 
theoretically disagree? Or we can refer to polarization over time: how much does group X 
disagree with group Y relative to how much they disagreed in the past? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Fiorina, Culture War? 21-25. 
34 Oxford English Dictionary, “polarized.” 
35 DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, “Have American’s Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?” 693. 
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  DiMaggio et al.36 and Noel37 mention four forms of polarization: dispersion,38 
bimodality, constraint, and between-group differences.39 Bimodality refers to the clustering 
of opinions along a spectrum into distinct modes. Take, for example, the classic liberal-
conservative seven point scale. If the data points are concentrated at 1 (extremely liberal) 
and 7 (extremely conservative), the distribution is bimodal—and arguably polarized (see 
Figure 1). If the data points cluster around the center, the distribution is unimodal—and not 
polarized (see Figure 2). 
As Fiorina and Abrams point out, labeling “a given distribution as polarized is generally a 
matter of judgment.”40 Observing polarization over time, however, is much less subjective. 
Moving from a unimodal distribution (Figure 2) to a bimodal one (Figure 1) clearly signals 
the process of polarization. 
 It is worth briefly noting a few distinguishing characteristics of the bimodal form. 
First, bimodality describes an aggregate distribution of opinions. This definition of 
polarization deemphasizes the role that groups play in organizing opinions; instead, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid. 
37 Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America. 
38 This form of polarization isn’t particularly relevant for my forthcoming discussion, but for more, see 
DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, “Have American’s Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?” 
39 As my forthcoming discussion will demonstrate, there is a significant amount of overlap between the 
constraint and between-group differences conceptions of polarization. 
40 Fiorina and Abrams, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” 566. 
	   12	  
focuses on where opinions (or ideological self-identification) are concentrated along a 
predefined spectrum. Second, moving away from the center of this spectrum represents 
increasingly extreme positions. Defining extremity requires subjective judgment; however, 
extremity does not mean consistency. For example, an individual might express a mixture 
of both “extreme” liberal and conservative positions: Favoring no regulation of business 
while at the same time endorsing the complete legalization of all drugs. We might call this 
individual a libertarian, but it would be misleading to place him in the “moderate” category 
along the liberal-conservative ideological dimension. In reality, this individual’s issue 
positions are “mixed.”41 Finally, bimodal polarization implies a disappearance of the 
center—the moderate portion—of the distribution. In sum, bimodal polarization answers 
the question, “have Americans become increasingly extreme in their political views?” 
 In contrast to the bimodal definition, recognizing the role that groups play in 
organizing voters into distinct camps and in facilitating conflict—in other words, between-
group differences—makes a lot of sense for the polarization narrative. Alan I. Abramowitz 
acknowledges the crucial function political parties serve in this respect: 
“Polarization…depends not just on the intensity of ideological and cultural conflict in 
society, but also on the extent to which these conflicts are expressed through political 
parties.”42 The intensity of differences between the political parties depends on at least two 
factors: the extent to which they generally take positions considered “far” away from each 
other and how unified the parties are in taking those positions. To clearly distinguish this 
form of polarization from the bimodality one, Fiorina43 and Levendusky44 label it “sorting” 
while Abramowitz calls it “partisan-ideological polarization.”45 
 How does “sorting” differ from bimodal polarization? Sorting refers to an 
increasing correlation between ideology and partisan identification. The ideological 
makeup of the political parties provides a salient example.46 Say the hypothetical political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This distinction is crucial not only because it differentiates the bimodal from the constraint form of 
polarization, but also because it is conceptually accurate. See Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in 
the American Public,” 22. 
42 Abramowitz, “Disconnected, or Joined at the Hip?” 79-80. 
43 Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War? 
44 Levendusky, The Partisan Sort. 
45 Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center. 
46 This example is based on Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War? 78. 
	   13	  
world contains thirty people, ten Democrats, ten Republicans, and ten Independents. At 
first, each party contains an equal number of liberals and conservatives while all 
Independents are moderates. But over time, each ideology becomes associated with a 
party. Eventually, all ten Democrats identify as liberal, all ten Republicans identify as 
conservative, and all ten Independents identify as moderate. This process could have 
occurred because members of a party changed their ideological identification or because 
individuals changed their partisan one: a conservative Democrat became a liberal 
Democrat or a conservative Democrat became a conservative Republican. Either way, the 
parties initially resemble each other ideologically, but over time the differences between 
the groups grow tremendously without a change in the aggregate distribution of ideological 
identification. 
 But, sorting doesn’t just denote a flip-flopping of partisan or ideological 
identification; it also represents the increasing homogenization of party members’ issue 
positions. On the surface, this may seem like a trivial distinction. Of course “sorted”47 
partisans take similar positions; after all, members of the same party now have a stronger 
tendency to identify with the same ideology. But because ideological identification is just a 
self-designated label, it does not necessarily mean individuals have the same ideological 
consistency in issue positions. As Morris Fiorina implies, the extent to which individuals 
consistently hold positions associated with a ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ ideology may 
change without their overall ideological identification changing at all: “[I]f subgroups 
become more homogenous, cross-pressures diminish. In that case, increases in constraint 
will cumulate in a way that makes subgroup political positions more internally 
homogenous and externally distinct.”48 Thus, sorting is also about constraint.  
 What is constraint? Issue constraint is the extent to which an individual’s beliefs 
are interdependent: holding opinion X means that this individual is also more likely to hold 
opinions A, B, and C.49 For example, if a given person opposes public health insurance, 
then that person is also more likely to oppose a carbon tax and, in general, to take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Individuals are defined as “sorted” when their partisan identification matches with the “correct” ideological 
identification: i.e. liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. Levendusky, The Partisan Sort. 
48 Fiorina and Abrams, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” 577. 
49 Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” 
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consistently conservative positions on many issues. Constraint is perhaps “the most 
important conception” of polarization because it “is what leads to defining coalitions”—it 
“is not about people moving apart” but “about the poles becoming increasingly well 
defined.”50 In other words, higher levels of intra-party constraint mean increasingly 
cohesive parties, and party cohesion increases the likelihood and forcefulness of political 
conflict.51 
 As it is currently used in the literature, “sorting” stands for a whole lot: a 
strengthening relationship between partisanship and ideological identification and 
increasing issue constraint. Is the term sorting even appropriate for the definition that 
Fiorina, Levendusky, and other ascribe to it? Perhaps it is not. Instead, the phrase partisan 
polarization better describes the same phenomenon.  
 To “sort” means “to arrange according to kind or quality.”52 But merely arranging 
things (in this case, people) assumes that the underlying characteristics of those things (in 
this case, either the ideological nature of their issue positions or their partisan 
identification) remain constant. A change in the level of issue constraint, even if solely 
limited to members within a subgroup, directly violates that assumption. As a result, using 
the term sorting to capture the notion of issue constraint potentially deemphasizes 
significant shifts in the ideological consistency of partisans’ beliefs. Therefore, throughout 
the rest of this paper I will use the term partisan polarization rather than sorting. 
 Although most scholarship has focused “exclusively on policy preferences” in 
defining polarization, a growing number of scholars are beginning to define polarization in 
terms of feelings: Affective polarization is “the extent to which partisans view each other 
as a disliked out-group.”53 From this perspective, it is not individuals’ concrete issue 
positions that matter—after all, public opinion suffers quite famously from response 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America, 171.	  
51 It is this type of cohesion that James Madison feared in Federalist 10 when he wrote of factions: “By a 
faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who 
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” 
52 Oxford English Dictionary, “sort.” 
53 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology,” 405-406. 
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instability54; instead, it only matters how strongly Democrats and Republicans dislike each 
other’s party. Compared to the definition for issue-based polarization, which has ignited an 
extensive conflict in the literature, the definition of affective polarization is much less 
controversial. 
Table 1: Definitions of Polarization 
Types of Polarization Definition Sample Scholars 
Bimodal Polarization How extreme Americans are in the 
issue positions that they express. 
Fiorina and Abrams (2008) 
Partisan Polarization (AKA Between 
Group-Differences) 
Partisan polarization consists of both 
sorting and constraint. 
Abramowitz (2010) 
Sorting When partisan and ideological 
identifications become increasingly 
correlated. 
Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 
(2005) 
Constraint When an individual’s beliefs are 
interdependent: holding opinion X 
implies holding opinions A, B, and 
C. 
Converse (1964) 
Affective Polarization How negatively partisans feel about 
the opposing party. 
Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) 
 
Are We Polarized? 
 Is contemporary American politics polarized? Answering this rather vague question 
requires answering a few more specific ones first. Are political elites polarized? What 
about the mass public? Which definitions of polarization apply? In this section, I’ll start by 
addressing the question of elite polarization and then move on to that of polarization in the 
American public. 
Elite Polarization55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For two conflicting explanations for response instability, see John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of 
Mass Opinion, 53-75; and Christopher H. Achen, “Mass political attitudes and the survey response,” 1218-
1231.  
55 Portions of this section were taken from a paper I wrote, entitled “Polarization in American Political 
Development,” in the fall of 2015 for Professor Jeffrey Selinger’s American Political Development course. 
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  There is broad consensus among scholars that political elites have become 
ideologically polarized. Ideological differences between the two parties in the House and 
Senate are greater than they’ve been since before World War One.56 Moderates have 
largely disappeared from Congress.57 And “issue constraint at the congressional level has 
expanded dramatically.”58 Even state legislatures have polarized.59 
 Poole and Rosenthal provide the clearest illustration of congressional polarization 
using roll call votes to map members of Congress along an ideological scale. By analyzing 
who votes with whom on a wide range of issues, they can assign each member of Congress 
an “ideal point” along the liberal-conservative dimension ranging from -1 (consistently 
liberal) to 1 (consistently conservative). Figure 3, which graphs these scores, also known 
as DW-NOMINATE scores, demonstrates the partisan polarization of Congress from the 
82nd (1951-53) to the 112nd (2011-2013) session. In the 1950s, most congressmen fell in 
the ideological center of the distribution and a significant number of Democrats (blue) and 
Republicans (red) overlapped ideologically. By 2011, few congressmen taking mixed 
positions remained and the parties had no members overlap ideologically.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress, 106-107. 
57 Fleisher and Bond, “The Shrinking Middle in the US Congress.” 
58 Barber and McCarty, “Causes and Consequences of Polarization,” 23. 
59 Shor and McCarty, “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.” 
60 I thank Professor Franz for permission in using this image from a lecture in his Public Opinion and Voting 
Behavior class. 
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Figure 3: Congressional Polarization (Using DW-NOMINATE) 
 
 Despite the fact that DW-NOMINATE has become the standard measure of 
congressional ideology, Richard Bensel argues that there are serious problems with 
assuming that these scores reflect ideology. In short, this measure cannot “distinguish 
partisan cooperation from individual commitments to ideological principles.”61 While DW-
NOMINATE does capture increasing party cohesion, it does not reveal whether that 
cohesion results from increasing ideological issue constraint or merely from increasing 
party discipline. 
 It is important to remember what DW-NOMINATE scores represent: roll call 
voting patterns not pure ideology. Nonetheless, Hans Noel elegantly illustrates why these 
scores accurately demonstrate ideological polarization in Congress. Instead of assuming a 
liberal-conservative dimension to DW-NOMINATE data as many others do, he looks for 
the development of ideology in the writings of political thinkers based on the policy 
positions they put forth.62 Because politicians do not vote solely based on their ideological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Bensel, “The Emperor Never Had Clothes,” 21. 
62 His dataset consists of thousands of articles (opinion pieces only) written by political thinkers in the 19th 
and 20th centuries. Publications range from The New Republic and The New York Times to The National 
Review and The Wall Street Journal. Although, as Noel admits, his sample of writings cannot possibly 
represent a perfectly random one, he does his best to choose publications that are “the best representatives of 
pundit opinion.” Articles were chosen in batches every twenty years between 1850 and 1990. Next, he and a 
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predispositions, the NOMINATE data cannot be said to accurately reflect ‘ideology’ per 
se; but writers, as opposed to politicians, are much more free to express their true views. 
Thus, their issue positions aren’t tainted by “partisan cooperation.” Noel reiterates this 
crucial point: “the issue space defined by the opinions is not influenced by the strategic 
considerations of political actors voting on the floor of Congress, and I therefore presume 
is a more direct measure of ideology.”63 
 By comparing DW-NOMINATE scores with the ideological issue spaced defined 
by pundits in the 1950s, Noel finds that ideological coalitions—developed in the writings 
of political thinkers—have restructured congressional party politics over time. This unique 
methodological approach ultimately leads Noel to an important conclusion: 
 [T]here is something special about politics today, and the red and blue, polarized, 
 values divide terminology is meant to capture that. There is a real phenomenon, 
 which deserves the attention it is getting. Conceptualizing ideology as an 
 independent force from parties, and recognizing that it is now oriented to reinforce 
 party divisions, is a significant aspect of that phenomenon.64  
In other words, contemporary congressional polarization is fundamentally different from 
congressional polarization at any point in the last century because it is the first time party 
has become generally synonymous with ideology across nearly all issue domains.   
 In sum, elite polarization has unequivocally occurred. Rather than one issue 
replacing another in the realm of political conflict, known as conflict displacement,65 
contemporary polarization—as ideology and party continue to reinforce one another—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
team of researchers engaged in an intensive (to say the least) data collection and coding endeavor. Not only 
did they read every single article in their sample, but they also wrote abstracts—summarizing the main 
argument advanced in each. To limit subjectivity, the articles were coded based on the author’s explicit (not 
assumed/implied) support or opposition to a policy proposal in Congress. I’ll give one example from Noel’s 
appendix on his data methods to clarify how this procedure works. Noel’s team summarized an article from 
the May 3rd 1950 issue of Human Events written by Frank Chodorov as follows: “We are buying the 
American people by telling them it is for their security, but social security, free education, tariffs, bonuses, 
parity payments are all just ways of limiting us.” They coded this data point as against Social Security. After 
eliminating duplicate opinions expressed by the same authors, Noel and his research crew coded almost 
8,000 opinions from hundreds of authors. Finally, using a statistical model similar to Poole and Rosenthal’s 
NOMINATE model, Noel treats authors’ expressed opinions just like roll call votes. An article in favor of 
Social Security counts just like a vote for the Social Security Act. After coding thousands of opinion pieces, 
Noel has substantial data reflecting the development of ideological coalitions as they present themselves in 
American political discourse. Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America, 94. 
63 Ibid., 93. 
64 Ibid., 180.	  
65 Hetherington, “Putting Polarization in Perspective,” 444. 
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extends to nearly all types of issues. This reality has led Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas 
M. Carsey to characterize modern partisan polarization with the phrase “conflict 
extension”: today, ideological partisans fight over everything (instead of just one or two 
things).66 While no single issue seems to threaten the viability of the Union like slavery 
once did,67 elite ideological polarization has produced a political environment for which 
there is no direct comparison in the last century—and perhaps in all of American history. 
 
Mass Polarization 
 The question of mass polarization has generated a significant amount of 
controversy in the literature. Much of this controversy, as Marc Hetherington points out, 
“can be understood as a question of definition.”68 But, another crucial question underlies 
differences in how scholars define polarization: who counts in politics? From the 
perspective of bimodality, all citizens’ views are important. Whether individuals identify 
with a party doesn’t matter. Although, in measuring bimodal polarization, scholars 
sometimes limit their study to subsets of Americans (e.g. just voters), their evaluations of 
bimodal polarization tend to focus on the distribution of opinions for all Americans 
independent of political engagement.69 In that case, the absence of bimodal polarization 
implies that there exists a large body of Americans with mostly moderate views.  
 Has polarization of the bimodal variety occurred? Evidence for the bimodal 
polarization of ordinary Americans has been relatively limited. In terms of extremity of 
issue positions, Levendusky finds that “there is some evidence of polarization,” but “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Layman and Carsey, “Party Polarization and ‘Conflict Extension’ in the American Electorate.” 
67 At the very least it is important to recognize that the political parties agree where it existentially counts: on 
the constitutional foundations of American government, which determine the legitimate transfer of power. As 
Jeffrey Selinger argues, “the two major parties…are polarized within a truncated ideological continuum.” 
Selinger, “Putting Polarization in Historical Perspective,” 21. 
68 Hetherington, “Putting Polarization in Perspective,” 415. 
69 Although nothing inherent in the definition of bimodal polarization precludes considering samples of 
politically engaged or sophisticated Americans, my impression has been that most scholars take this general 
approach. See Fiorina and Abrams, “Political Polarization in the American Public”; Fiorina, Abrams, and 
Pope, Culture War?; Levendusky, The Partisan Sort; and Fiorina and Levendusky, “Comments on Chapter 
Two.” 
	   20	  
majority of the electorate remains closer to the center than to the poles.”70 In terms of 
ideological self identification, Fiorina observes that since the 1970s there has been 
“virtually no change in the distribution of American ideological identification.”71 In sum, 
for the majority of Americans, bimodal polarization has been minimal if it has occurred at 
all. 
 Relative to bimodal polarization, evaluations of partisan polarization focus much 
more on subgroups of individuals: first and foremost the political parties, but also the most 
politically engaged within those parties. In order to show that partisan polarization has 
occurred, two conditions must be met. First, ideology and party must be increasingly 
related. Second, the ideological consistency of each group must have increased. Most 
evidence suggests that both conditions have been met. 
 As Matthew Levendusky exhaustively documents, Republicans are much more 
likely conservatives and Democrats much more likely liberals than a generation ago.72 
Using NES partisan and ideological identification data, Alan I. Abramowitz reports similar 
results: “the [ideological identification] gap between Democratic and Republican 
identifiers doubled between 1972 and 2004.”73  
 Issue constraint within the parties has increased too—though scholars still argue 
about its scope. Abramowitz reports that large percentages of voters now take consistently 
conservative and consistently liberal positions compared with voters in 1984—and that this 
tendency has become especially prominent for the most politically engaged voters.74 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 To test for increasing extremity in issue positions, Levendusky constructs a scale based on the average 
issue position of respondents to six questions, which appear in both the 1984 and 2004 NES. Levendusky, 
The Partisan Sort, 71. 
71 Fiorina tests this contention using three data sources: NES data comparing 1972 to 2004, GSS data ranging 
from the 1970s to 2000s, and Gallup data from the 1970s to 2000s (which uses a five-point rather than seven-
point scale). Fiorina and Abrams, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” 570. 
72 “In 1972, 28 percent of the electorate was sorted, but that figure grows considerably over the next three 
decades to 46 percent in 2004.” Levendusky also notes: "If we take into account the fact that many 
Americans consider themselves "moderates" or cannot locate themselves on the liberal-conservative scale--
and hence cannot be sorted by definition--these trends become even more impressive." See Levendusky, The 
Partisan Sort, 45. 
73 Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center, 45. 
74 Abramowitz constructs his own liberal-conservative policy scale based on responses to seven NES policy 
questions asked in both 1984 and 2004. He assigns each respondent a score between -7 (consistently 
conservative) and 7 (consistently liberal). Then, making a distinction based on political engagement, he finds 
that “in 1984, 41 percent of voters were located within one unit of the center of the [liberal-conservative 
policy] scale and only 10 percent were located near the left and right extremes. In 2004 only 28 percent of 
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Fiorina and Levendusky argue that Abramowitz’s claim is misleading because his measure 
of ideological polarization exaggerates the amount of issue polarization that has actually 
occurred.75 Instead, Fiorina cites Pew data that reports a 4% increase (from 10% to 14%) in 
average issue position differences between Democrats and Republicans from 1987 to 
2007.76  
 The Pew Research Center’s recent report, “Political Polarization in the American 
Public,” sheds more light on the question of mass partisan polarization. Measuring 
ideological consistency using ten “value” questions as of 2014, Pew data suggests that 
many more Americans take consistently conservative or consistently liberal positions.77 
Furthermore, ideological consistency differences between the parties (including 
independent leaners) have become increasingly stark.78 Among the politically engaged, 
increases in ideological consistency are even more astounding.79 In sum, significant 
partisan polarization has occurred for the most politically engaged Americans,80 especially 
in the intervening time (2008-2015) since Abramowitz and Fiorina first argued about its 
scope. While the majority of Americans still hold relatively moderate views, that majority 
is shrinking.81 
 As my above discussion of the literature on mass polarization illustrates, scholars 
have—for the last decade—been immersed in a debate over definition, measurement, and 
scope. Despite the valuable fruits of this labor, this debate has diverted attention away 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
voters were located within one unit of the center and 23 percent were located near the left and right 
extremes.” Abramowitz, “Disconnected, or Joined at the Hip?” 77. 
75 They argue that Abramowitz’s coding procedure inflates the amount of polarization because it takes 
relatively minor changes in an individual’s survey responses to bump someone from a “moderate” category 
to an “extreme” one. Fiorina and Levendusky, “Comments on Chapter Two.” 
76 Fiorina and Abrams, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” 578. 
77 “Over the past twenty years, the number of Americans in the ‘tails’ of this ideological distribution has 
doubled from 10% to 21%.” Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” 9. 
78 Pew reports that in 1994 the median Democrat held positions to left—on the consistency scale—of 64% of 
Republicans while in 2014 that number had ballooned to 92%. Similarly, in 1994, the median Republican 
held positions to the right of 70% of Democrats while in 2014 Republicans held positions to the right of 94%. 
Ibid., 10. 
79 Today almost four-in-ten (38%) politically engaged Democrats are consistent liberals, up from only 8% in 
1994 and 20% in 2004. And the rise is also evident on the right: 33% of politically engaged Republicans are 
consistent conservatives, up from 23% in 1994, and just 10% in 2004. Ibid., 25. 
80 There are many different metrics for capturing the concept of political engagement. For the Pew study, the 
“politically engaged are defined as those who are registered to vote, follow government and public affairs 
most of the time and say they vote always or nearly always.” Ibid., 24. Scholars disagree about the size of the 
politically engaged electorate—like polarization it often depends on the measurement that they utilize. For an 
example of this debate see Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center and Fiorina, Culture War? 
81 Ibid., 9. 
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from a momentous development in the American electorate: affective polarization. 
Scholars have only recently begun to catch on. 
 In 2004, Morris Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope published Culture 
War? The Myth of a Polarized America, a key contribution to the mass polarization 
literature. In what comes across as a quick side note in the book, Fiorina mentions that 
“one colleague suggested that ‘affective’ measures might show more evidence of 
increasing polarization than ‘cognitive’ measures.”82 Using the NES feelings 
thermometer,83 he briefly explores this suggestion. He finds “a slight increase (5-10 
degrees) in emotional polarization” for partisans from the 1980s to 2004 and a larger 
increase in emotional polarization measured on the feelings thermometer using the terms 
“liberal” and “conservative.”84 This evidence doesn’t quite help to dispel the ‘myth of a 
polarized America’—though neither does it fundamentally undermine it; and as a result, he 
doesn’t attribute much weight to the notion of affective polarization after the very brief 
mention. 
 Scholars took their eye off the ball. In the past few decades, and especially since 
2004, affective polarization has transformed the American electorate and partisan politics 
writ large. As a shift in recent research suggests, this change has been impossible to 
ignore.85 In their 2014 report on political polarization, the Pew Research Center describes a 
“rising tide of mutual antipathy” between the political parties: much larger percentages of 
partisan identifiers have negative views of the opposing party; these negative views have 
become increasingly intense in character; and those who participate most in politics 
express the most antipathy.86 
 Looking at NES feelings thermometer data between 1972 and 2012, Alan 
Abramowitz’s analysis largely confirms the same results: the most politically engaged had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Fiorina, Culture War? 68. 
83 The feeling thermometer asks respondents to rate how warmly or coolly the feel towards particular groups 
of people on a scale of 0 to 100. 
84 Ibid., 68-69. 
85 Between 2012 and 2015 many scholars published articles on affective polarization. For some prominent 
examples, see Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology”; Iyengar and Westwood, “Fear and 
Loathing across Party Lines”; Fiorina, “Party Homogeneity and Contentious Politics”; and Abramowitz, 
“Partisan Nation.” 
86 Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” 32-33. 
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the strongest negative feelings towards the opposing party and irrespective of engagement, 
“the average difference between voters’ ratings of the parties increased from 
approximately 23 degrees to approximately 39 degrees.”87 Marc J. Hetherington and 
Thomas J. Rudolph present the NES data slightly differently, but again reach the same 
conclusion. They break the feelings thermometer into ten intervals to examine the increase 
in negative feelings towards the opposing party at the polls of the distribution. Between 
1980 and 2012, those data suggest significant affective polarization: “Republicans and 
Democrats are abandoning the middle and heading for the poles in their negative feelings 
about the other party.”88 
 In perhaps the most interesting exhibition of affective polarization, Shanto Iyengar 
and Sean J. Westwood test a sample of 2,500 adults to measure their implicit attitudes 
towards the oppositional political party. They utilize a variant of the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT),89 which is often used to measure implicit racial bias. Measuring partisan 
implicit bias instead of explicit evaluations of antipathy provides researchers with a much 
more direct measure of affective feelings—untainted by social desirability bias.90 Iyengar 
and Westwood reach an incredible conclusion about Americans’ feelings toward out-
partisans: After giving participants an implicit racial bias test as well as the partisan one, 
they find implicit bias towards members of the out-party substantially exceeds that based 
on race.91 
 If that result isn’t shocking enough, consider the fact that when Pew asked 
Americans whether “the [opposing] party’s policies are so misguided that they threaten the 
nation’s well-being, ” 27% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans responded that they do. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Abramowitz, “Partisan Nation,” 4. 
88 Hetherington and Rudolph, Why Washington Won’t Work, 31. 
89 These tests essentially use reaction time experiments to reveal implicit attitudes. See Greenwald, McGhee, 
and Schwartz, “Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition.” 
90 “Implicit measures—not subject to cognitive processing—are more accurate since they do not permit 
active masking or accentuation of feelings toward out groups.” Iyengar and Westwood, “Fear and Loathing 
across Party Lines,” 692. 
91 By their measure, constructed using response times from the IAT, implicit partisan bias between 
Republicans and Democrats was much larger than that of implicit racial bias between Whites and African 
Americans. Ibid., 696. 
	   24	  
As Pew observes, for many, feelings towards those in the out-party have moved to “a deep-
seated dislike, bordering on sense of alarm.”92 
 Affective polarization has fundamentally reshaped the American electorate. 
Democrats dislike Republicans and Republicans dislike Democrats with a greater intensity 
than at any time since measurements began tracking out-party sentiment. It is time for 
scholars to devote much more attention to this angle of polarization. For the average, 
individual voter, defining and focusing on polarization in terms of affect rather than issue 
preferences make the most sense: “current debates over the degree of ideological 
polarization within the electorate and dismissals of polarization as a symptom of partisan 
sorting do not come to grips with the concept of partisan identity and the significant role 
played by partisan affect in the psyche of ordinary Americans.”93 
Table 2: Are Americans Polarized? 
Type of Polarization Who Counts? Are They Polarized? 
Bimodal Polarization The average American citizen 
regardless of political engagement. 
Modestly, if at all. 
Partisan Polarization Members of the political parties and 
the most politically engaged. 
Yes 
Affective Polarization Members of the political parties and 
the most politically engaged. 
Yes 
What Causes Affective Polarization? 
 Although Iyengar et al.94 have been relatively successful in reframing the mass 
polarization debate around affect rather than ideology, there has been a limited amount of 
research on what causes affective polarization; however, from this research three primary 
theories emerge. First, partisan polarization at both the elite and mass level has increased 
the ideological distance between parties. As a result, some scholars argue that Democrats 
and Republicans’ increasingly divergent issue positions cause them to rate out-partisans 
more negatively.95 Second, increasingly negative political campaigns have contributed to 
affective polarization.96 Third, the explosion of partisan media is responsible for instilling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” 35. 
93 Ibid., 704-705. 
94 See Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology” 
95 See Abramowitz, “Partisan Nation” and Rogowski and Sutherland, “How Ideology Fuels Affective 
Polarization.” 
96 See Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology” 
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intense partisan animus in the American electorate.97 It is worth briefly reviewing existing 
evidence for each theory. 
 The substantial partisan polarization that has occurred over the past few decades 
means that the political parties are much more homogenous than they once were. At the 
elite level, this homogeneity has led to, what Fiorina has recently called, “contentious 
politics”: characterized by a loss of “understanding of, sympathy for, and eventually 
tolerance of those” in the opposing party.98 Abramowitz argues that this type of politics 
extends to the mass public as well. He finds that ideological polarization—that is, the 
increasing perceived ideological distance between individuals and the opposite party—is 
closely connected to affective polarization.99 Using both survey and experimental research, 
Jon. C. Rogowski and Joseph L. Sutherland reach a similar conclusion: those with the most 
ideological distance from fictional congressional candidates give the most negative 
reactions to representatives of the out-party. In addition, they demonstrate that, as the 
ideological gap between two hypothetical candidates increases (and thus the stakes of the 
electoral choice increases), affective evaluations polarize.100  
 Despite this evidence, there are also reasons to doubt that policy preferences 
explain the explosion of affective polarization in the American electorate. Iyengar et al. 
find only “moderate to weak effects of policy preferences on net partisan affect.”101 
Furthermore, Lilliana Mason argues that even for the majority of Americans, who do still 
express “moderate” issue positions, affective polarization has produced a strange result: “It 
is not that we are angry because we disagree so strongly about important issues; instead, 
we are angry, at least partially, because of team spirit.”102 On the one hand, ideological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Levendusky, How Partisan Media Polarize America. 
98 Fiorina, “Party Homogeneity and Contentious Politics,” 150. 
99 Using ANES data, Abramowitz demonstrates a strong relationship between individuals’ perceived 
ideological distance from the opposing political party and negative feeling thermometer scores. Since 1980, 
individuals increasingly perceive the out-party as further from their own ideological position. Abramowitz, 
“Partisan Nation.” 
100 Rogowski and Sutherland, “How Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization.” 
101 Iyenger et al. substantiate their contention with two pieces of evidence. First, they note that “sorted” 
partisans—liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans—only have slightly higher differences in 
thermometer ratings than non-sorted partisans. Second, they use ANES data from 1988 and 2012 to show 
that individuals’ concrete issue positions on questions of social welfare had only a modest influence on 
negative affect while positions on questions of cultural difference—abortion, gay marriage, etc.—had no 
influence at all. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology,” 421-424. 
102 Mason, “The Rise of Uncivil Agreement,” 155. 
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polarization cannot account for significant portions of affective polarization—most 
Americans tend to agree on most issues even though they may detest members of the 
opposition party. On the other hand, ideological polarization likely does reinforce affective 
polarization, at least for the most politically engaged partisans who do tend to hold strong 
ideological issue positions and are most affectively polarized.103 
 What about negative campaign advertising? Abramowitz suggests that because the 
mass electorate is much more polarized than in the past, Americans are more receptive to 
negative campaigns than they once were. In today’s political climate, perhaps the most 
effective way to mobilize partisans is to foment hatred for the other side.104 By looking at 
differences in levels of affective polarization for battleground states (states where political 
campaigns focus most of their messaging) and non-battleground states, Iyengar et al. found 
that both “battleground-state residence” and “the volume of general election attack ads 
aired in a state positively predicted net partisan affect.”105 This evidence suggests that 
negative campaigning does contribute to affective polarization. 
 Theoretically, however, negative campaigning cannot explain the majority of 
affective polarization because campaigns don’t make up a large enough portion of 
individuals’ political information diet. As a result, Iyengar et al. point to the increase of the 
partisan media as a fruitful area of further exploration.106 I give a much more thorough 
review of the literature on the partisan media and its influence on affective polarization in 
chapter three. Overall, this literature suggests that partisan media is a potentially 
substantial source of affective polarization.107 At the same time, those who view this type 
of programming tend to already be polarized—so the role of the partisan media in causing 
the widespread affective polarization that exists in the American electorate is at least 
somewhat suspect.108 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center and Abramowitz, “Partisan Nation,” 6. 
104 Abramowitz, “Partisan Nation,” 17. 
105 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology,” 425. 
106 They write: “Exposure to loud negative campaigns is very likely not the strongest factor, much less the 
only factor, contributing to affective polarization.” Ibid., 427. 
107 See Levendusky, How Partisan Media Polarize America; Mutz, “Effects of “In-Your-Face” Television 
Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition; and Berry and Sobieraj, The Outrage Industry. 
108 Arceneaux and Johnson, Changing Minds or Changing Channels? 
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 Taken together, ideological issue polarization, negative campaigning, and the 
partisan media provide an initial set of explanatory factors for affective polarization; 
however, no scholars have yet provided a comprehensive treatment of the question. As 
Iyengar et al. note: in order to gain a greater understanding of the roots of mass affective 
polarization, “future research will need to address these possible explanations more 
systematically.”109 While a systematic evaluation is well beyond the scope of this paper, I 
contribute to this hole in the literature by presenting evidence that links elite congressional 
polarization to an increasingly partisan political discourse—a discourse that in theory has 
likely induced or at the very least has continued to perpetuate affective polarization. 
 
The Polarization of American Political Discourse 
 The Economist Magazine argues that politicians’ arguments are increasingly 
“sterile,” making use of facts as “weapons with which to club the opposition” rather than 
to find areas of potential agreement.110 In other words, America’s political discourse is 
increasingly partisan. It is reasonable to expect this type of discourse to engender affective 
polarization.111 In this section, I provide empirical evidence for the contention that as 
Congress has polarized so too has American political discourse. 
 
Literature Review 
 David Mayhew famously argued that public messages from congressman generally 
fall into three categories: credit claiming, advertising, and position taking.112 Recently, 
however, Justin Grimmer and Gary King have used an innovative type of digital text 
analysis—computer-assisted clustering—to discover a fundamentally new category of 
congressional messaging: “partisan taunting.”113 Utilizing a data set of 64,033 press 
releases from members of the U.S. Senate from 2005-2007, Grimmer and King find that 
27% of these press releases were “explicit, public, and negative attacks on a political party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology,” 428. 
110 “When facts are weapons,” The Economist Magazine. 
111 This expectation is an explicit assumption of this paper and deserving of future research. 
112 Mayhew, The Electoral Connection. 
113 Grimmer and King, “General purpose computer-assisted clustering and conceptualization,” 2648. 
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or its members.”114 As Grimmer writes, this finding is especially important as it is likely 
that these “direct attacks contribute to the growing affective polarization in society.”115 
 Grimmer and King’s results suggest that partisan taunting is common practice in 
congressional political discourse. But has this type of partisan messaging increased as 
Congress has polarized? At least in terms of presidential rhetoric, the answer seems to be 
no. In fact, making use of perhaps the largest dataset of presidential campaign speeches to 
date (containing nearly every general election campaign speech from 1952-2012), Jesse 
Rhodes and Zachary Albert demonstrate that as polarization has increased, partisan appeals 
in speeches have decreased for Democrats and remained relatively stable for 
Republicans—who weren’t particularly partisan in their rhetoric to begin with.116 Rhodes 
and Albert argue that this low level of partisan rhetoric makes theoretical sense because 
presidential candidates in a general election scenario need to appeal to moderate voters.117 
 In the context of day-to-day congressional rhetoric, however, I expect the result to 
be quite the opposite. Compared to the President, congressmen—particularly members of 
the House, but also members of the Senate—only need to appeal to relatively politically 
homogenous constituencies. Grimmer and King present the best evidence for this 
expectation: they found that senators in non-competitive states (i.e. a Republican 
representing a heavily Republican state, or a Democrat representing a heavily Democratic 
state) were much more likely to use their press releases to “taunt” the opposing party or 
members of the opposing party.118 At the same time that polarization (at least in voting 
behavior) has increased, seats in Congress have also become safer.119 Although their 
analysis doesn’t make a distinction between the safety of congressional seats and 
polarization as measured by roll call votes, Grimmer and King’s results imply that 
American political discourse—at least measured by congressional press releases—has 
become increasingly polarized. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Grimmer, Representational Style in Congress, 168. 
115 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
116 Rhodes and Albert, “The transformation of partisan rhetoric in American presidential campaigns, 1952-
2012.” 
117 “Faced with growing antagonism to partisanship, especially among moderate voters, presidential 
candidates have increasing [sic] presented a conciliatory public image as a way to boost their electoral 
prospects.” Ibid., 2. 
118 Grimmer and King, “General purpose computer-assisted clustering and conceptualization,” 2650. 
119 Silver, “As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House Stand?” 
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Data and Methods 
 Given the previous literature, I hypothesize that partisan polarization in Congress 
has led to an increasingly partisan political discourse. To test this hypothesis, I use Twitter 
data (“tweets”) from members of the 114th Congress. It is reasonable to ask, why use 
Twitter data? First, nearly every single member of Congress (henceforth MC) has a Twitter 
account and uses it regularly to communicate with constituents.120 MCs primarily use 
Twitter to provide their constituents with information and to take positions on pertinent 
political issues121; but they also use it to try to mobilize voters and to attack political 
opponents.122 Second, Twitter is rapidly growing in importance as a source of political 
information.123 And although Twitter users who follow MCs are not a representative 
sample of Americans in general, they do tend to reflect the subset of Americans on which 
this paper focuses—those most influential in politics.124 Finally, because MCs’ Twitter 
discourse is often reflective of their followers’ Twitter discourse—particularly so for 
followers of the same party, followers who are most politically engaged, and followers 
from their own district—MCs’ Twitter discourse proxies well for American political 
discourse writ large.125 Thus, if a MC’s ideological extremity (measured using their DW-
NOMINATE score) positively predicts how partisan their tweets are, then it follows that 
American political discourse has polarized just as elites in Congress have. I call this 
hypothesis the polarized tweeting hypothesis. 
 My dataset reflects a comprehensive sample of MCs (every single member of the 
114th Senate and all but two members of the 114th House are represented).126 In sum, this 
dataset contains 1,070,370 tweets, which to my knowledge represents the largest and most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 In collecting the Twitter data, I found accounts for every Senator and all but two members of the House—
Charlie Dent (D) of Pennsylvania and Rob Bishop (R) of Utah. 
121 Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers, “Twitter Use by the U.S. Congress”; and Hemphill, Otterbacher, and 
Shapiro, “What’s Congress Doing on Twitter?” 
122 Evans, Cordova, and Sipole, “Twitter Style.” 
123 Pew Research Center, “The Evolving Role of News on Twitter and Facebook.” 
124 “Citizens who discuss politics on Twitter are more likely to be educated and politically interested.” 
Barberá, “Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together,” 77. 
125 Barberá, Bonneau, Egan, Jost, Nagler, and Tucker, “Leaders or Followers?” 
126 See Data Appendix I for more information on the procedure that I used for collecting this Twitter data as 
well as for additional descriptive statistics of the dataset. 
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comprehensive set of congressional twitter data compiled to date.127 In addition, this cross-
section spans a fairly large segment of time, containing tweets ranging from February 15th, 
2008 to February 9th, 2016. 
 Once I compiled Twitter data for each MC, I largely followed the same procedure 
that Rhodes and Albert used when they measured partisan rhetoric in presidential 
campaign speeches.128 First, I wrote an R script with a keyword dictionary to capture only 
tweets that make explicit mention of one or both of the political parties. This filtered set 
contained 112,367 tweets. Next, I replicated the codebook developed by Rhodes and 
Albert to categorize partisan statements.129 Tweets could be coded into one of eight 
mutually exclusive categories: Positive statements about only the Democratic Party; 
negative statements about only the Democratic Party; positive statements about only the 
Republican Party; negative statements about only the Republican Party; statements 
contrasting the parties in favor of the Democrats; statements contrasting the parties in favor 
of the Republicans; bipartisan statements; and statements not about the political parties. 
 Along with two gracious volunteers,130 I discussed the codebook, trained on a 
practice set of tweets, and then talked over the results of that practice. Next, each of us 
hand coded the same random sample of 500 tweets derived from the filtered set containing 
tweets with explicit party mentions. Although tweets—due to their short length—can be 
somewhat difficult to categorize, we achieved a relatively high level of inter-coder 
reliability (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.675).131 
 Because coding all 112,367 tweets by hand was logistically infeasible, I took 
advantage of a powerful software tool for automated content analysis: ReadMe. Developed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Golbeck et al. use 6,000 tweets, Evan et al. analyze 67,119 tweets, and Hemphill et al. look at 30,373 
tweets. All of these studies used hand coding to classify tweets. Because I was able to make use of relatively 
new digital text analysis technique, my dataset is orders of magnitude larger than all similar studies to date. 
128 Again, see Rhodes and Albert, “The transformation of partisan rhetoric in American presidential 
campaigns, 1952-2012.” 
129 I thank Professors Jesse Rhodes and Zachary Albert for sending me their codebook. 
130 I also thank my friends Luke Trinka and Thomas Wiesner for taking the time to help me code tweets by 
hand. 
131 Hand coding yielded a low number of tweets categorized as contrasting the parties in favor of one. As a 
result, I recoded the category “statements contrasting the parties in favor of the Democrats” as a “Positive 
statement about only the Democratic party” and I recoded the category “statements contrasting the parties in 
favor of the Republicans” as a “Positive statement about only the Republican party.” As a result, my 
estimates will likely underestimate the extent to which MCs are making substantively negative statements 
about one of the parties; however, this should not affect my eventual dependent variable because both 
positive statements about one’s own party and negative statements about the opposing one count as “partisan 
tweets.” 
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by Daniel J. Hopkins and Gary King, this tool only requires researchers to hand code a 
small subset of text documents. It uses a supervised machine-learning algorithm to “learn” 
the coding scheme and then to categorize large volumes of text documents. Note that this 
categorization does not occur at the individual document level; instead ReadMe takes a 
collection of text documents and outputs an “approximately unbiased estimate” of the 
proportion of those documents in each category.132 In addition to the Rhodes and Albert 
study, other political science work has also successfully used ReadMe to classify large 
volumes of textual data.133  
 In the context of my Twitter data, ReadMe produced estimates for each MC: the 
proportion of a given MC’s tweets that fall into each category. To control for how 
frequently a MC tweets, I used this measure to calculate the portion a MC’s tweets (from 
the original set of 1,070,370 not just tweets making an explicit mention of the parties) that 
fall in each category. Finally, to get my key dependent variables, I reconstructed two of 
Rhodes and Albert’s analytic categories: partisan and bipartisan statements.134 Because this 
measure only counts tweets as “partisan” if they make explicit mention of one or both of 
the political parties, it likely substantially underestimates the proportion of partisan tweets 
in congressional Twitter discourse. Take for example, a tweet that Sen. Ted Cruz posted on 
January 29th 2016: “The Obama administration has secretly settled refugees in #Texas. 
This lawlessness must end.” Or this January 11th 2016 tweet from Sen. Harry Reid: “After 
8 years of disaster under President Bush, the State of our Union has only grown stronger 
each year under President Obama.” My data does not account for these types of tweets. 
 Finally, I gathered data on each MC in order to create a model that predicts the 
partisanship of individual MC’s Twitter messaging. The Congressional Record135 had data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Hopkins and King, “A Method of Automated Nonparametric Content Analysis for Social Science,” 229. 
133 See King, Pan, and Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences 
Collective Expression”; and Jamal, Keohane, Romney, and Tingley, “Anti-Americanism and Anti-
Interventionism in Arabic Twitter Discourses.” 
134 Partisan statements consist of negative statements about the opposite party or positive statements about 
one’s own. Bipartisan statements consist of tweets in which the MC calls for bipartisanship or criticizes the 
partisanship of both political parties. See Rhodes and Albert, “The transformation of partisan rhetoric in 
American presidential campaigns, 1952-2012,” 4. 
135 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. 
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on each MC’s party affiliation,136 years of incumbency, and whether they were a member 
of the Senate or House. The official Senate and House webpages contained a list of 
members in the leadership.137 Voteview.com contained DW-NOMINATE scores for each 
MC in the 113th Congress.138 The Cook Political Report compiles a Partisan Voter Index 
score for every congressional district and State for the 113th Congress.139 This index uses 
the results of the previous Presidential election to measure how much more “Republican” 
or “Democratic” a given district is relative to the rest of the country. 
 
Model 
 Do more ideologically extreme MCs engage in a more partisan Twitter discourse? 
Scholars generally rely on DW-NOMINATE scores to measure polarization in 
Congress.140 Because these scores range from -1 (consistently liberal) to 1 (consistently 
conservative), I measure a MC’s ideological extremity using the distance of their DW-
NOMINATE score from zero (Distance From Zero). As Distance From Zero increases, the 
polarized tweeting hypothesis predicts that MCs will be more partisan in their Twitter 
discourse. But this effect likely does not have an unambiguously linear relationship. That 
is, extremity predicts partisan tweeting, but as extremity continues to increase it likely 
increases partisan tweeting at a decreasing rate. Therefore, I include a squared term 
(Distance From Zero Squared) in the model. 
 Other than this primary independent variable, the model controls for a number of 
other factors. Because senators tend to represent more heterogeneous constituencies than 
do representatives, it makes sense to expect that they engage in less partisan tweeting. 
Because past research141 has found that senators in safer seats tend to “taunt” the opposing 
party more frequently, the model controls for the “safety” of a given State or district by 
using a slightly modified version of the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voter Index (PVI) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 I coded Senator Angus King (I-ME) and Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) as Democrats because they 
caucus with the Democratic Party. 
137 See “Senate Organization Chart for the 114th Congress,” United States Senate; and “Leadership,” United 
States House of Representatives. 
138 Because DW-NOMINATE scores are only calculated after the completion of a session of Congress, I had 
to omit recently elected MCs from my model. http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm 
139 Wasserman, David. “Introducing the 2014 Cook Political Report Partisan Voter Index.” 
140 Poole and Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress. There are problems with assuming DW-NOMINATE scores 
reflect ideology. See Bensel, “The Emperor Never Had Clothes.” 
141 Grimmer and King, “General purpose computer-assisted clustering and conceptualization,” 2650. 
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score.142 The model also controls for the numbers of years a MC has been an incumbent, 
membership in congressional leadership, and partisan affiliation. 
 Using these explanatory variables, I estimate two primary models. Model 1a 
predicts the proportion of a MC’s tweets that fall into the partisan category (Percentage of 
Partisan Tweets). Model 2a predicts the proportion of a MC’s tweets that fall into the 
bipartisan category (Percentage of Bipartisan Tweets). 
 
Model 1a: Percentage of Partisan Tweets = β0 + β1(Distance From Zero) + β2(Distance 
From Zero Squared) + β3(Senator) + β4 (Years of Incumbency) + β5(Congressional 
Leadership) + β6(Democrat) + β7(Adjusted Partisan Voter Index) 
 
Model 2a: Percentage of Bipartisan Tweets = β0 + β1(Distance From Zero) + β2(Distance 
From Zero Squared) + β3(Senator) + β4 (Years of Incumbency) + β5(Congressional 
Leadership) + β6(Democrat) + β7(Adjusted Partisan Voter Index) 
 
Results 
 A simple OLS regression for Model 1a confirms the polarized tweeting hypothesis: 
more extreme MCs tweet in a more partisan manner than do less extreme members. 
Moving from a DW-NOMINATE distance of 0 (most moderate) to a distance of 1 (most 
extreme) results in a relatively large increase in partisan tweeting. For a given MC, moving 
from 0 to 1 means that an additional 10% of their total number of tweets shift into the 
partisan category (β1 = 0.1011, p < 0.001). However, this coefficient overstates the 
increased proportion of partisan tweets because the true relationship is non-linear. 
Including the square term (β2 = -0.0567, p < 0.05) reveals that although increasing 
extremity increases partisan tweeting, it does so at a decreasing rate.143 As a result, if an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 The Partisan Voter Index (PVI) essentially gives a partisanship score for each congressional district or 
State. For example, a score of D+7 indicates that a given district went 7 points more Democratic than the 
national average in the previous Presidential elections. In my model, I adjusted this score to account for how 
“safe” a district is for an MC. I modified, MCs’ scores if their district went more heavily for the opposite 
party. For example, if a Republican represented a district that is D+7, they got an adjusted PVI score of -7. If 
a Democrat represented that district, they got an adjusted PVI score of 7. As a result, lower numbers 
represent less safe districts while higher numbers represent increasingly safe districts. 
143 To test the robustness of my primary model, I also ran three variations of it: 1b, 1c, and 1d. In 1b, the 
squared term is dropped and although the effects size on the primary explanatory variable is consistent with 
1a, this model has a worse fit. In models 1c and 1d, I used a MC’s distance from the median DW-
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MC moved from most moderate to most extreme, they would be expected to increase the 
proportion of their tweets that fall into the partisan category by approximately 4.5%. 
Figure 4 displays the predicted effects of ideological extremity on partisan tweeting. 
Figure 4: Predicted Effects of Ideological Extremity on Partisan Tweeting 
 
 All but one of the other independent variables also achieved statistical significance 
(p < 0.001). Senators were less partisan in their tweeting than were representatives            
(β3 = -0.0119). An additional year of incumbency predicts slightly more partisan tweeting 
(β4 = 0.0008). Membership in congressional party leadership significantly increases 
partisan rhetoric (β5 = 0.0213). Finally, Democrats (even after controlling for ideological 
extremity) tend to be more partisan in their tweeting than their Republican counterparts (β6 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NOMINATE score rather than from zero. In 1c, neither the Distance From the Median nor the squared term 
achieves statistical significance. However, this is because starting from the median member rather than from 
zero skews the distribution in a conservative direction and eliminates the non-linear relationship in the data. 
After the squared term is dropped, 1d yields effect sizes similar to that of 1a and 1b for DW-NOMINATE 
scores measured from the median member. 
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= 0.0110). Because my sample (N = 443) consists of data from members of both chambers 
of Congress, rather than from just the Senate144 or from past Presidents,145 my model 
avoids the problems of small sample size inherent in similar studies. Unexpectedly, the 
“safety” of a MC’s seat has no statistically significant relationship with their partisan 
tweeting. Table 3 displays the complete regression results for this model. 
 One might expect that if ideological extremity predicts partisan tweeting, it might 
also predict a lack of bipartisan tweeting (the bipartisan tweeting hypothesis). Model 2a 
tests this expectation. Surprisingly, bipartisan tweeting appears to have no statistically 
significant relationship with ideological extremity. While Democrats and members of the 
congressional leadership do seem to engage in slightly more bipartisan tweeting than do 
Republicans and non-leaders, Model 2a fails to account for most of the variation in 
bipartisan tweeting (Adjusted R-squared = 0.1132).146  
 Though this result seems to fly in the face of intuition, it is consistent with the 
extant literature. In an examination of 304,763 floor speeches by members of Congress, 
Westwood finds no relationship between a MCs ideology and the frequency with which 
that member employs bipartisan rhetoric. He also provides an interesting defense of this 
result: all MCs gain electoral benefits from bipartisan rhetoric—and electorally, it doesn’t 
seem to matter if they follow up on this rhetoric with legislative compromise.147 
 
 
 	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Grimmer and King, “General purpose computer-assisted clustering and conceptualization” 
145 See Rhodes and Albert, “The transformation of partisan rhetoric in American presidential campaigns, 
1952-2012.” 
146 See Data Appendix I for complete results of this regression model. 
147 Westwood, “The Partisanship of Bipartisanship.” 
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Table 3: Multivariate Analysis of the Polarized Tweeting Hypothesis (OLS) 
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Adjusted R2 0.263 0.257 0.259 0.258 
N 443 443 443 443 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Discussion 
 As I discussed earlier in this chapter, political elites are more polarized than at any 
time in the past century. It is in this political environment that many moderates have found 
it difficult to remain in Congress,148 been consistently replaced by more extreme 
candidates,149 or nudged to the poles in their own legislative behavior for fear of “getting 
primaried.”150 Extreme voices now dominate political discourse.151 And because more 
extreme MCs tend to use more partisan rhetoric on Twitter, my results lend support for the 
oft-stated, but rarely tested contention that America’s political discourse has become more 
polarized just as polarization has gripped the country in other realms.  
 It might be reasonable to object that it is unfair to generalize the rhetorical patterns 
of MCs on Twitter to the broader American political discourse. After all, those who follow 
MCs on Twitter are more educated and more politically involved than the average 
American; and only a very small percentage of Americans actually follow MCs on Twitter. 
Nonetheless, I argue that these results are generalizable. Followers of MCs on Twitter are 
precisely the people that have the most influence in the political system and thus on the 
political discourse. Because Twitter has a “retweet” feature in which individuals can 
essentially forward tweets they like to their entire network of followers, MCs’ partisan 
rhetoric has the power to reach a much broader audience than just a MC’s immediate 
followers. More and more often, the media also feature tweets in their coverage of 
politics.152  
 Although it remains an open question as to how representative congressional 
Twitter discourse is of American political discourse writ large, taken together with 
Grimmer and King’s analysis of congressional press releases and Barberá et. al’s finding 
that congressional Twitter discourse often reflects rather than drives that of their followers, 
the above results provide further evidence that America’s political discourse has become 
more partisan. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Snowe, “Fighting For Common Ground.” 
149 Aldrich, “Did Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison ‘Cause’ the U.S. Government Shutdown?” 
150 Boatright, “Getting Primaried.” 
151 Grimmer, Representation Style in Congress, 155-160. 
152 One would also expect the most partisan tweets to get the most coverage as conflict has inherent “news 
value.” 
	   38	  
 Are elites driving this polarization of political discourse? Or are they merely 
reflecting the discourse of their constituents? Because the partisan composition of a MC’s 
district does not seem to have any relationship with how they tweet, the above results 
suggest that polarization at the elite level has led to an increasingly partisan political 
discourse. On the other hand, because MCs’ Twitter behavior tends to reflect rather than 
direct that of their followers,153 it may still be the case that (even if not driven by the 
partisan composition of their districts) MCs’ partisan tweeting is driven by that of their 
most ardent supporters: those who follow them on Twitter. Thus, these results suggest an 
increase in partisan communication at the mass as well as the elite level.  
 It is worth noting that these results are in conflict with those of Grimmer and 
King.154 While they find that senators in safer States taunt their opposition more often, 
after controlling for an MC’s DW-NOMINATE distance, Model 1a suggests something 
different: in both the House and Senate, it is a MC’s DW-NOMINATE distance that 
matters, not the partisan composition of that MC’s district. 
 What does this increasingly polarized political discourse mean for affective 
polarization? Putting the question of causality aside, a discourse dominated by partisan 
appeals almost certainty exacerbates the tremendous amount of partisan antipathy that 
already exists in American politics. And in a vicious cycle, partisan rhetoric has likely 
become an increasingly profitable electoral tactic as the American electorate has become 
increasingly motivated by partisan animus. 
 The polarization and communications literatures have not yet fully isolated the 
causes of affective polarization. My investigation of partisan rhetoric in Twitter discourse 
contributes to this emerging literature. Particularly with respect to Twitter and other social 
media platforms, this project suggests many potential avenues for future research. Given 
the practice of “retweeting,” how large of an audience do MCs’ tweets actually reach? Is 
the media more likely to use their tweets in news coverage if they are related to partisan 
conflict? Is it possible to measure the affective consequences of partisan tweeting on MCs’ 
followers and even on the followers of those followers? Does engaging in more partisan 
communication increase a MC’s number of followers? Is partisan tweeting driven mostly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Barberá, Bonneau, Egan, Jost, Nagler, and Tucker, “Leaders or Followers?” 
154 Grimmer and King, “General purpose computer-assisted clustering and conceptualization” 
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by political elites, or is it a reflection of the discourse that politically engaged Americans 
are having every day? While the data analyzed in this project suggests the former, it is 
more than likely some combination of both and more research ought to be conducted. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I set out to describe the political context within which those who are 
most interested and most engaged in politics find themselves immersed. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, that is a political context that has become increasing polarized. At the elite 
level, moderates are going extinct. Americans who are relatively disengaged from politics 
still don’t hold very strong, or ideological issue positions, but the most active citizens, and 
thus, those with the most influence on the political process certainly do. Today, Democrats 
hold intensely negative feelings toward Republicans and so too do Republicans toward 
Democrats. A politics defined by affective polarization has brought about a vitriolic 
political environment in which hatred for the opposing party takes center stage. It has 
brought about a political discourse that is stubbornly sterile and unproductively divisive. It 
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Chapter Two: Affective Polarization and Information Processing 
 Partisan polarization has a number of important implications for American 
democracy.  For some scholars, a polarized Congress is a problem because it represents the 
interests of extremists rather than the interests of the vast majority of moderate 
Americans.155 For others, the problem is institutional: ideologically opposed parties 
engender intense gridlock in a legislative system filled with veto points.156 When it comes 
to polarization’s impact on voters, “less attention has been paid”157; however, when 
scholars do discuss this impact, they do so more positively. Elite polarization allows voters 
to choose between more distinct candidates and thus, “to participate more effectively.”158 
Polarization, by raising the stakes of elections, can increase voter turnout and political 
engagement.159 
 While these implications are significant, this chapter will take a different path. I 
will focus on the impact of partisan polarization on the quality of voters’ beliefs. The 
polarization literature tends not to spend much time discussing the implications of 
polarization for the actual quality of voters’ beliefs. One reason for this lack of 
investigation may be that many scholars work under the assumption that any such 
investigation will require making subjective value judgments about the content of 
particular belief systems. For example, asserting that some beliefs are of higher quality 
than others might necessitate arguing that for whatever reason conservatism is better than 
liberalism or vice-versa. Hans Noel warns that “[i]t is hard to evaluate the consequences of 
ideology without engaging the content of those ideologies…Any claim that politics is too 
polarized makes this same mistake.” But it is possible to get at the question of quality 
indirectly: “we can think about what kind of ideological discourse we want, in the same 
way that many democratic theorists have thought hard about deliberation and discourse in 
other contexts.”160 From this perspective, how people form their beliefs matters more than 
what they actually believe. Because, as I will review in this chapter, passion consistently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War? 
156 Mann and Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks. 
157 Levendusky, The Partisan Sort, 140. 
158 Ibid., 140. 
159 Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center. 
160 Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America, 193. 
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biases how each of us engage with political information, affective polarization has serious 
implications for the quality of our beliefs.  
 Political symbols have “mobilize[d] human emotions” throughout history.161 
Hearing the word “taxes” quickly evokes negative feelings while hearing the word 
“justice” positive ones. Political campaigns prey on this psychological truth, making use of 
emotional appeals by pairing an opposing candidate with music, concepts, labels, and 
images that evoke negative affect.162 Through classical conditioning, this negative affect 
transfers to its associated political object and is stored along with that object in memory. 
This process, known as affect transfer, can be extrinsic: “feelings generated by an event 
unrelated to the object are transferred to the object.”163 Or it can be intrinsic: “positive or 
negative feelings that are relevant to an object become associated with it through simple 
pairing.”164  
 Milton Lodge and Charles S. Taber designed two experiments to test this affect 
transfer theory. They subliminally presented participants in their study with 
unambiguously positive words—like “love,” “laughter,” or “joy”—or negative words—
like “torture,” “grief,” or “sad”—while participants read background information about a 
hypothetical candidate. Surprisingly, even though these words were presented outside of 
conscious awareness, Lodge and Taber found that the affect of the subliminal prime words 
transferred to later evaluations of the candidates for highly sophisticated participants. In 
addition, they found that the more these sophisticated participants thought about their 
evaluations, the more the subliminal primes had an effect. These results suggest that 
“people’s candidate evaluations are the product of far more than they are consciously 
aware of.”165 
 Over time, partisans are consistently exposed to affect-laden messaging; political 
concepts, leaders, groups, and even words trigger emotions upon mention. In some sense, 
political concepts become “hot”: “all political objects that have been thought about in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Sears, “The Role of Affect in Symbolic Politics,” 14. 
162 Brader, Campaigning for Hearts and Minds. 
163 Lodge and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter, 57. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid., 124. 
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past are tagged to positive and/or negative feelings.”166 As is common in cognitive 
psychology research, Lodge and Taber use reaction time experiments to test their hot 
cognition hypothesis. In a series of studies, participants were tasked with identifying target 
words as positive (“delightful”) or negative (“miserable”) “as quickly as possible without 
making too many errors.”167 Unbeknownst to the participants in these studies, Lodge and 
Taber flash a political object prime (“Clinton,” or “Democrat,” or “Death Penalty”) before 
they show the positive or negative target word.168 Because affectively congruent prime 
words have consistently been shown to facilitate faster response times in evaluating target 
words,169 political objects—if they are indeed “hot”—should produce the same result. For 
example, if the prime “Hillary” instantly evokes negative feelings, then the participant 
should be faster at recognizing that “death” is a negative target word. The results of this 
test of “hot cognition” are striking: “affect it seems is triggered automatically on mere 
presentation of a political attitude object” and, the most politically sophisticated are, 
“because of their frequent evaluation of political objects, more prone to the effects of 
automatic affect on political attitudes.”170 In other words, fairly minimal exposure to a 
political object (like the word “Republican”) automatically evokes negative or positive 
affect. 
 Some scholars, most notably George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael 
MacKuen, approach feelings and political reasoning from a different perspective. Instead 
of an affect-oriented (like-dislike) theory, they focus primarily on discrete emotions. This 
theory, known as affective intelligence, is rooted in evolutionary biology. As humans 
evolved, emotions helped them make judgments pursuant to their own survival.171 
Generally speaking, we have two “systems”—each associated with different emotional 
states. First, we have a dispositional system “primarily responsible for managing reliance 
on habits” and “previously learned strategies.”172 This system produces emotions like 
anger, enthusiasm, and depression. Second, we have a surveillance system, which 	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“monitors the environment for novel and threatening stimuli.”173 This system produces 
emotions like tranquility and anxiety. Much of the research arising out of affective 
intelligence theory focuses on how anger and anxiety influence political judgment 
processes. In fact, there is some evidence that anger induces individuals to approach and 
evaluate political information in a partisan fashion while anxiety actually leads to 
deliberative processing in which individuals don’t solely rely on their predispositions to 
form opinions, but rather consider new information.174 
 As individuals, each of us likes to believe in the validity of our own beliefs. We’ve 
weighed the arguments and evidence on both sides of a question and rationally come to the 
correct position. But, despite the fact that so many people feel so strongly about their own 
views, few people, if any at all, ever arrive at their beliefs by processing information in this 
deliberative and unbiased way. Instead, humans are hampered by countless cognitive 
biases, many of which strong partisan sentiments have the potential to exacerbate. 
Conducting an exhaustive examination of these biases and how partisanship interacts with 
them is well beyond the scope of this paper; however, to get a sense of how, at a 
psychological level, affective partisanship undermines the deliberative ideal outlined 
above, I call attention to a few problematic information processing tendencies emphasized 
by the political psychology literature. 
 To what end do we process information? We have at least two underlying 
motivations in tension with one another. On the one hand, we want to assimilate new 
information to form the most accurate beliefs possible. On the other, we want new 
information to reaffirm the conclusions that we already have. As Roy F. Baumeister and 
Leonard S Newman maintain, in the first case, we act like “intuitive scientists,” searching 
for a balanced and relatively complete set of information, evaluating our own potential 
biases, and ultimately integrating new information in an evenhanded way. In the second, 
we act like “intuitive lawyers,” selectively choosing information meant to bolster pre-
determined convictions, criticizing challenging information, and integrating new 
information only to confirm those original convictions.175   
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 What drives the “intuitive lawyer” motivated reasoning process? How does this 
type of reasoning undermine the deliberative democratic ideal for information processing? 
Recall two of the main components of the deliberative ideal for information processing: 
exposure to a wide range of perspectives and open-mindedness in considering those 
perspectives. In my review of the political psychology literature it will become apparent 
that, driven by feelings (often unconsciously), partisans (those most influenced by affective 
polarization) flout this ideal on both fronts.176 First, through selective exposure to 
information, partisans have a tendency to gravitate toward belief-confirming information. 




 The selective exposure hypothesis is “the idea that people engage in belief-
protection by exposing themselves primarily to pro-attitudinal arguments.”177 This 
tendency poses a direct challenge to deliberative democratic theory: deliberation can’t 
occur if people only see information with which they already agree. The question of 
selective exposure has become especially salient in recent years as media consumers have 
much more control over the content they receive. I discuss the effect of a changing media 
environment on voters’ information processing in the next chapter. At the moment, the 
question of direct interest is psychological: do individuals have “an underlying 
psychological tendency to seek support and avoid challenge”?178  
 The political psychology literature on selective exposure does not provide a 
straightforward answer. David O. Sears and Jonathan L. Freedman reviewed a number of 
studies conducted in the 1960s and found that under some circumstances people did prefer 
belief-consistent information; however, in others people even preferred belief-inconsistent 
information. Instead of a general psychological predisposition to choose belief-supportive 
over belief-challenging information, because of the mixed evidence in the early literature, 
Sears and Freedman suggest that “exposure is complexly determined by a great many 
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factors that are incidental to the supportiveness of the information.”179 While many studies 
may show a strong correlation between belief predispositions and information exposure, 
those studies fail to support a causal claim. 
 Slightly more recent research, however, complicates this story. Dieter Frey, in a 
review of research between 1965 and 1986, finds that there are number of conditions under 
which individuals selectively expose themselves to information. First, when individuals 
have more freedom to choose their information, they are more selective in the pro-
attitudinal direction. Second, selective exposure is strongest for people who are the most 
committed to their original decisions (or beliefs). Third, people might actually choose 
“dissonant information” if they think it will be easily refutable, and thus serve to confirm 
pre-existing beliefs. Fourth, an increase in the amount of information available from which 
to choose increases selectivity effects. Fifth, when people perceive conflicting information 
to be useful they might have a preference for belief-inconsistent information: if one 
expects to need to debate a topic, it makes sense to learn about oppositional arguments.180 
It is important to note that most of the evidence in Frey’s review “concentrated mainly on 
selective seeking rather than avoiding” behavior.181 
 As of 1992, although not citing Frey’s 1986 defense of selective exposure, the 
evidence in the psychology literature seemed mixed and conditional enough for John 
Zaller to discount selective exposure in his famous Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model 
of information processing and attitude change. In fact, it is “the implicit-assumption” of his 
model that “a person’s predispositions, although affecting acceptance of persuasive 
messages, do not affect reception.”182 Zaller had good reason to take this position. Much of 
the evidence in support of the selective exposure hypothesis suffered from problems of 
external validity—inapplicable to “situations of mass persuasion.”183 
 Contemporary research attempts to reconcile past conflicting findings. R. Kelly 
Garrett argues that much of the controversy over selective exposure can be resolved by 
treating seeking and avoiding behavior as “separate phenomenon.”184 From his perspective, 	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people exhibit “de facto selective avoidance, motivated by an attraction to opinion-
reinforcing information, not an aversion to opinion-challenging information.”185 
 Other scholars, most notably Milton Lodge and Charles Taber emphasize the 
centrality of affective feelings in motivating selective exposure. In a 2006 experiment, 
Lodge and Taber found evidence of a confirmation bias: “the prediction that people, 
especially those who feel strongest and know the most, will seek out confirmatory 
evidence and avoid what they suspect might be disconfirming evidence.”186 Lodge and 
Taber argue that past research fails to find significant selective exposure effects because it 
comes at the issue from a cognitive dissonance perspective rather than an affect-oriented 
one. In other words, issues used to test selective exposure have been too “affectively tepid” 
and thus provided “insufficient motivation to engage in selective exposure.”187  
 In their experiment, Lodge and Taber used affectively stimulating issues: gun 
control and affirmative action. Using an innovative information board experimental design, 
Lodge and Taber tracked which sources—labeled with the names of well-known groups 
like the NRA, the NAACP, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party—participants 
in their study chose to view. Their results confirmed that even though participants were 
instructed to treat information in an “even-handed way,” those with the strongest prior 
attitudes and most sophistication exhibited the most confirmation bias in selecting 
information sources.188 
 Scholars working within the affective intelligence framework also argue that their 
theory reconciles conflicting results in the selective exposure literature. Aversive emotions 
like anger cause selective exposure while anxiety leads to consideration of a wide range of 
perspectives.  MacKuen et al. devise an experiment to test this hypothesis. Participants sat 
down at a computer and were randomly shown a newspaper article either detailing how 
schools in Oregon began implementing a new affirmative action policy or how schools in 
Oregon rejected an affirmative action policy. The researchers then asked participants how 
reading the article made them feel. They found that the article induced a variety of 
emotions, among them aversion and anxiety. Participants were then set free to click on 	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clearly labeled links to articles supportive of their position, unsupportive of their position, 
or totally unrelated to politics in general. Based on these viewing patterns, MacKuen et al. 
found that aversion “provokes a resistance to outside information, while anxiety leads to a 
desire to learn about alternative views.”189 
 Although evidence for selective exposure as a general psychological tendency has 
been historically controversial, recent research suggests that people at least have a 
disposition to seek belief-affirming political information, especially if they already have 
strong attitudes. Whether it is affect or discrete emotions, feelings play a key role in 
understanding why people engage in selective exposure. This emphasis on feelings instead 
of dissonance reduction is especially important in an environment of affective 
polarization—an environment in which partisans have more motivation than ever to 
selectively choose what information they view. 
 
Motivated Reasoning 
 Motivated reasoning involves much more than just selective exposure. After all, no 
one can truly avoid every piece of disconfirming information. What happens when people 
do confront information that does not conform to their preexisting predispositions? The 
deliberative ideal necessitates treating new information and new arguments with an open 
mind. It requires a willingness to listen regardless of the identity of the messenger. As with 
selective exposure, feelings push partisans far short of this ideal. 
 It is no surprise that people tend to view evidence supportive of their pre-existing 
beliefs as more persuasive than evidence unsupportive of those beliefs; this tendency is 
known as the prior belief effect.190 What is the psychology behind these biased 
evaluations? Kari Edwards and Edward E. Smith developed the “disconfirmation model” 
to explain the information processing mechanisms underpinning the prior belief effect. 
This model makes four claims: 1) people find belief-consistent arguments more convincing 
than belief-inconsistent ones; because it takes more cognitive effort to discredit than to just 
accept an argument, 2) people take more time thinking about belief-inconsistent arguments 
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and 3) will have more—as John Zaller would say—“considerations"191 in their mind; 4) the 
content of these considerations will tend to refute belief-inconsistent arguments.192 
 In two experiments, Edwards and Smith found support for these four hypotheses on 
a wide range of issues: people perceived belief-consistent information to be more 
convincing then inconsistent; they spent “considerably longer scrutinizing arguments that 
ran counter to their prior beliefs”; when the researchers prompted participants to write 
down their considerations, participants had much more to put down for the belief-
inconsistent arguments; and a higher proportion of those considerations opposed belief-
inconsistent arguments compared with belief-consistent ones.193 Interestingly, Edwards 
and Smith also discovered that “participants who were evaluating an incompatible 
argument generated more redundant refutational arguments than participants with equally 
extreme prior beliefs who had less emotional conviction.”194 Just like many other biases, 
emotion exacerbates disconfirmation bias. 
 In the 2006 study in which they expose participants to pro and con arguments for 
affirmative action and gun control, Lodge and Taber reach a similar conclusion. Those 
with the strongest prior beliefs and most initial knowledge about the two issues showed the 
strongest prior belief bias: participants judged confirming arguments as much stronger than 
disconfirming.195 In terms of time spent thinking about arguments, those with the strongest 
prior beliefs and highest levels of political knowledge spent the most time “denigrating, 
deprecating, and counter-arguing…incongruent information.”196 When asked to “leave 
their feelings aside and to concentrate on what made the arguments weak or strong,” 
participants demonstrated the importance of affect in their “reasoning”—often responding 
to the prompt with the justification that they “like” or “dislike” certain “facts or figures 
supporting an argument.”197 Though it might seem ridiculous to evaluate the strength of an 
argument using the criterion “I dislike it,” this is often how the most knowledgeable 
actually “reason.” As Lodge and Taber demonstrate, motivated reasoning and 	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disconfirmation bias is actually highest among those who are most knowledgeable—and 
especially most passionate—about an issue. 
 In Lodge and Taber’s affirmative action and gun control experiments, the 
combination of selective exposure, disconfirmation bias, and prior attitude effect all 
promote attitude polarization: “those on either side of a political issue should become more 
attitudinally extreme over time, even when exposed to the same balanced stream of 
information.”198 It is important to point out that this attitude polarization effect only 
occurred for the most sophisticated participants and those with the strongest priors. 
 These two studies—that of Edwards and Smith and Lodge and Taber—describe the 
information processing practices that lead to the prior belief effect and attitude 
polarization. Description, however, is only part of the story. What causes people to 
denigrate challenging information; to have overwhelmingly negative thoughts in their 
mind when they do so; and, thus, to evaluate arguments in a manner that leads to attitude 
polarization? To get at this question, I’ll briefly compare two models of information 
processing, which draw the causal arrow in slightly different ways.  
 Political scientists are probably most familiar with John R. Zaller’s Receive-
Accept-Sample (RAS) model. More directly out of the contemporary political psychology 
literature, Milton Lodge and Charles S. Taber’s The Rationalizing Voter has already 
become, as Brendan Nyhan put it, “the most important study of motivated reasoning about 
politics that has been published to date.”199 In it, Lodge and Taber develop the John Q. 
Public (JQP) model. Although these are far from the only models of political information 
processing, because the first is a prototypical memory-based model and the second a 
motivated reasoning one, “it is particularly instructive to contrast” the two.200 
 Receive-Accept-Sample explains how people form their opinions. The word form, 
used in this context, does not imply that individuals hold true beliefs stored at some 
discrete point in memory. Rather, people “construct”201 opinion statements based on the 
balance of “considerations” most salient to them at any given moment in time. So why 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Ibid., 163. 
199 Nyhan, “The Rationalizing Voter,” 365. 
200 Ibid., 366. 
201 As Zaller writes, “citizens do not typically carry around in their heads fixed attitudes…rather, they 
construct ‘opinion statements’ on the fly as they confront each new issue.” Zaller, The Nature and Origins of 
Mass Opinion, 1. 
	   50	  
does Zaller characterize his model as “Receive-Accept-Sample”? He explains it this way: 
“Opinion statements…are the outcome of a process in which people receive new 
information, decide whether to accept it, and then sample at the moment of answering the 
question.”202  
 In Zaller’s model, whether a piece of information gets accepted is a function of 
political predispositions and political knowledge. His resistance axiom states:  
 People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political 
 predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual 
 information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their 
 predispositions.203 
Stated bluntly, individuals tend to blindly accept information that reinforces their 
predispositions and to aggressively discount information that does not. Of course, they can 
only accept or reject considerations if they are politically aware enough to recognize which 
information conforms and which conflicts. Thus, low awareness citizens tend to mindlessly 
accept whatever information they are given although they are also less likely to “receive” 
information in the first place. In either case, this axiom “makes no allowance for citizens to 
think, reason, or deliberate about politics.”204 In many ways, Zaller’s resistance axiom is 
analogous to Lodge and Taber’s disconfirmation hypothesis—although, as I will 
emphasize in a moment, affect—as opposed to partisan contextual cues—is the key causal 
difference. 
 Once someone has received political information and then accepted or rejected that 
information as a consideration, what determines the opinion he expresses? The thoughts 
that enter one’s mind for evaluation depend on salience: “The more recently a 
consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve 
that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the 
head for use.” Once the most salient considerations have been called to mind, “individuals 
answer survey questions by averaging across considerations.” 205 The number and salience 
of considerations that can be called to mind obviously vary from person to person; 	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nonetheless, in Zaller’s model, opinion statements ultimately reflect what considerations 
an individual can consciously recall from memory.  
 To be fair to Zaller, he does acknowledge that “considerations may involve feelings 
or emotions.”206 However, in his model, feelings are not what fundamentally drive 
reasoning. Partisan contextual cues—that is, recognizing that “that argument is a 
Republican position and I’m a Democrat so I should reject it”—lead to biased acceptance 
(storing in memory) of information. Importantly, people form their evaluations based on an 
averaging of the most salient considerations that come to mind. From this perspective, 
evaluations are a function of reasons—albeit biased ones—previously stored in memory. 
 Placing affective feelings front and center in their model, Lodge and Taber draw 
the causal arrow in the opposite direction: our evaluations occur spontaneously based on 
the affect associated with a given issue—and the reasons we express in support of those 
evaluations are no more than rationalizations for the affective appraisals we’ve already 
unconsciously made. Understanding how this works requires understanding the associative 
conception of memory on which the John Q. Public (JQP) model rests as well as the 
concept of affect contagion, which “is the underlying process that drives motivated 
reasoning and rationalization in political thinking.”207 
 Like most information processing models, the John Q. Public model relies on an 
associative conception of memory. We have “a long-term memory (LTM) for storing facts, 
beliefs, images, feelings, habits, and behavioral predispositions.”208 We have a working 
memory (WM): the limited system that allows us to consciously attend to information 
(what Zaller might refer to as the “top of the head”). And somehow information needs to 
get from LTM to WM. That’s where the associational conception of memory comes in. 
Concepts or “objects” in LTM are related to one another in an associational network. In 
JQP, for example, the concept “Obama” might be related to “Democrat” and “Liberal,” 
which also might be related to each other.209 Spreading activation explains which concepts 
enter WM: “an object node in LTM switches from being dormant to a state of readiness 
with the potential to be moved in WM when it is activated, either by direct recognition or 	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because it is linked to an associated object of thought.”210 Many concepts remain primed, 
but do not enter conscious awareness, because of their relatedness, cognitive or affective, 
to objects that have been activated strongly enough to enter conscious thought. This model 
of how memory works leads to an implication similar to that of the RAS model: “all 
beliefs and attitudes will be constructed in real time from whatever cognitive and affective 
information is momentarily accessible from LTM.”211 Unlike in RAS, however, 
information processing in JQP involves much more than just a conscious draw of 
considerations from memory. 
 As mentioned before, political concepts are often “hot.” Exposure to these concepts 
can induce what Lodge and Taber call “intrinsic affect” because feelings are linked directly 
to them in memory. Or affect might enter the information-processing stream “incidentally” 
through “unrelated environmental stimuli or prior mood.”212 In either case, affect 
contagion, so ominously named, is likely to occur. Lodge and Taber define affect 
contagion as “the facilitation of considerations from memory that are affectively congruent 
with initial feelings and the inhibition of incongruent considerations.”213 In other words, 
spontaneously generated initial feelings systematically bias the thoughts that make it into 
working memory. Perhaps even more concerning, this initial feeling (and its influence on 
thought) often occurs outside of conscious awareness. 
 Lodge and Taber conduct two very similar studies to test their affect contagion 
hypothesis. Both yield remarkable results. The researchers found that a cartoon face 
prime—smiling or frowning—flashed for 39 milliseconds, which is well out of conscious 
awareness, affected the valence of thoughts that entered participants’ minds when they 
were asked to write down their considerations as they were shown an issue prompt about 
illegal immigration. In addition, the participants’ balance of thoughts strongly influenced 
their eventual evaluation of the issue. Most shockingly, their results demonstrated that 
“fleeting images of cartoon smiley faces have a larger effect than prior immigration 
attitudes on the valence of thoughts in response to illegal immigration policy prompts.”214 
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 So which model, RAS or JQP, better approximates how partisans process 
information? Undoubtedly, JQP applies more readily to the real political world: affect 
dominates in the realm of passionate politics. With that said, the RAS framework requires 
much less time and resource intensive methodologies. Whereas Lodge and Taber needed to 
devise somewhat complex laboratory experiments to measure unconscious affect, all 
Zaller’s model really requires is a fairly run-of-the-mill survey. In the domain of survey 
research, which is “often sterile and artificial,” political scientists clearly benefit from 
RAS’s omission of affect.215 In either model, however, one implication is glaringly clear: 
partisans treat challenging information with a closed-mind. 
 Research rooted in affective intelligence theory reinforces this same implication. In 
the same study that demonstrated how aversive emotions led to selective exposure, 
MacKuen et al. also find that aversion caused people to dig in their heals on their initial 
positions on affirmative action while anxiety promoted compromise. After giving 
participants the option to click on pro or con articles about affirmative action, MacKuen et 
al. instructed them to express their opinion on the policy “first from their own point of 
view and second, taking into account everyone’s views.”216 Then they asked participants to 
write an open-ended essay “to explain their choices” and “to comment on the principles 
that underlie affirmative action,” coding essays “with respect to the subjects’ willingness to 
seek alternative solutions—rather than merely arguing for or against the Oregon 
affirmative action policy.”217 Anger made participants much less likely and anxiety made 
them more likely to compromise; however, this anger affect only holds for those 
participants who also engaged in a biased information search pattern because of that anger. 
Even after controlling for bias in participants’ information search, anxiety had a 
moderating effect on opinions.218 
 Are there limits to motivated reasoning? That is, if someone gets bombarded with 
disconfirming information, is there a point at which it ceases to counterproductively 
reinforce preexisting positions? Fusing the affect and affective intelligence approaches, 
David P. Redlawsk, Andrew J. W. Civettini, and Karen M. Emmerson ask “do motivated 	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reasoners ever ‘get it’? In their evaluations of fictitious political candidates, subjects in the 
Redlawsk et al. study became more positive about their initially preferred candidates in the 
face of incongruent information about them; and, at higher levels of incongruent 
information this trend reverses. Their results suggest that people engage in motivated 
reasoning at low levels of incongruent information until the buildup of incongruent 
information causes them to feel increasingly anxious—at which point they reverse 
processing strategies, allowing new information to more accurately influence their 
candidate evaluations.219 
 Evaluations of issues and candidates aren’t the only victims of motivated 
reasoning. Even factual beliefs can be motivated. Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifer identify 
a ‘back-fire’ effect by which attempts to correct factually incorrect beliefs—like the belief 
that Saddam Hussein had WMD’s in Iraq—actually make ideologically opposed 
participants believe in the false information more.220 Brian E. Weeks argues that using 
partisanship, as Nyhan and Reifer do, to explain the persistence of political misperceptions 
misses an important explanatory factor: emotion. He finds that anger exacerbates political 
misperceptions while anxiety reduces them. Rather than solely partisan motivation, it is the 
interaction of anger and partisanship that leads people astray.221 
 The political psychology literature sheds light on an extremely consequential 
implication of affective polarization: partisan passion undermines deliberation. It motivates 
us to avoid a wide-variety of arguments. Often unconsciously, we like information that 
already confirms our feelings. Whether rooted in affect or anger, motivated reasoning 
infects nearly every stage of information processing. From the arguments we find 
persuasive to the very thoughts we bring to the top of our heads, we reject information 
because it is incongruent with our feelings. In sum, strong emotions make deliberative 
information processing extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. 
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Chapter Three: Does the Media Facilitate Fact or Faction? 
 Chapters one and two paint a depressing picture. American politics is increasingly 
polarized. Much of that polarization is affective in nature—and it is particularly intense for 
those most engaged in politics. Because affect induces selective exposure and motivated 
reasoning, affective polarization means that facts often matter less than factions in 
American politics. What is more a pity, these deeply ingrained, and often uncontrollable, 
psychological tendencies have become most salient just as individuals have gained 
unprecedented access to vast volumes of political information. 
 But there is good reason to be skeptical of my argument. After all, it has largely 
assumed that individuals’ information processing practices are independent from their 
information environments. Perhaps the way that people actually get their information does 
not always lead to the type of bias that the political psychology literature predicts. Or 
perhaps it leads to more. This chapter explores these possibilities. 
 Theoretically, the media environment could undermine the deliberative ideal in at 
least two ways. First, the fragmentation of the media environment might provide greater 
opportunity for selective exposure, allowing affectively motivated partisans to filter out 
uncomfortable information. Second, the inflammatory delivery of political information 
may infuse political concepts—parties, leaders, and individual issues—with more affect, 
thereby causing, or at the very least exacerbating, affective polarization, and as a result 
increasing the likelihood that individuals engage in motivated reasoning.  
 In evaluating the contemporary media environment’s influence on how individuals 
deliberate about politics, I follow scholars222 who argue that the media should function as a 
marketplace of ideas: it ought to facilitate a public discussion in which “ideas battle for 
supremacy on the basis of merit, and where a reason-based consensus emerges that guides 
the public direction of society.”223 In essence, the media should be a forum for “mass-
mediated deliberation.”224 With this ideal in mind, which aspects of each form of media—
partisan, detached, or social—ought to be encouraged? And which discouraged? Given the 
contemporary media environment, how might the deliberative individual best consume 
political information? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 See Schmuhl and Picard, “The Marketplace of Ideas.” 
223 Curran, 126. Also see the Introduction of this paper for a brief discussion of this ideal. 
224 Schmuhl and Picard, “The Marketplace of Ideas,” 141. 
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Placing the Contemporary Media Environment in Historical Context 
 It is easy to uncritically accept the argument that, with the Internet, more people 
have more access to more data (and spin) than ever before. But it is important to gain an 
appreciation for just how unprecedented the contemporary media environment is. 
 Historically, technological advances have shaped the role of the media in American 
society. Perhaps it is no surprise that politicians have always used information as 
ammunition in the rhetorical war that so often defines politics. The “media” of the early 
19th century, which largely consisted of partisan newspapers, functioned primarily as the 
“organs of the first political parties.”225 The chief purpose of these newspapers was not to 
inform the public, to hold government officials accountable, nor to promote deliberation.226 
First and foremost, these newspapers were meant to persuade the public in service of elite 
ends.227  
 As printing press technology improved, both the character and purpose of 
newspapers shifted.228 In the mid 19th-century, the “penny press” began to challenge the 
partisan one: “The penny papers made their way in the world by seeking large circulation 
and the advertising it attracted, rather than by trusting subscription fees and subsidies from 
the political parties.”229 This newfound commercial viability and independence from the 
political parties moved papers away from coverage of national politics. They increasingly 
covered local news: police reports, murder trials, and sports.230 This approach to news 
heavily influenced much of the media environment of the late nineteenth and early 	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thanks to the invention of the steam-powered cylinder press; the introduction of a process for turning wood 
pulp into paper (previously produced using rags); and the expansion of a vast railroad transportation network 
across the country, the price of a newspaper dropped from six cents to one and mass circulation became 
possible. See Schudson, Discovering the News, 31-33. 
229 Ibid., 18. 
230 As Michael Schudson writes, the “penny papers made the ‘human interest story’ not only an important 
part of daily journalism but its most characteristic feature.” They “invented the modern concept of ‘news.’” 
See Schudson, Discovering the News, 22-27. 
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twentieth century as entrepreneurs like William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer 
utilized this “sensational” model to great commercial success.231 The New York Times 
represents an exception to this news-as-entertainment approach.232 
 After exposure to extensive propaganda during World War I and the emergence of 
the public relations industry, many people began to doubt the veracity of the information 
they read in newspapers.233 In reaction, Walter Lippmann, among others, argued that 
journalism needed professionalization. It needed highly trained and respected journalists. 
And above all, it needed a central guiding norm: objectivity. In practice, this meant that 
opinions belonged on the editorial page; and for their work to be truly classified as news, 
journalists had to present all sides of an issue without revealing a preference for one side or 
another.234 
 In the 1920s and 1930s, radio revolutionized how people got their information. In 
the 1950s, television did the same.235 But like newspapers in the middle of the twentieth 
century, radio and broadcast television were just different mediums for the same 
“objective” style of journalism.236 In fact, because these new communications technologies 
expanded the reach (audience size) of news outlets, news stations and television networks 
had even more of an incentive to follow a non-partisan model—lest they alienate large 
segments of the population. The absence of party polarization and lack of economic 
competition for the large media outlets during this time period created an environment in 
which Lippmann’s objective model flourished.237  
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  Despite its dominance in the practice of journalism throughout the twentieth 
century, some thinkers—John Dewey in particular—challenged the norm of objectivity.238 
From his perspective, seeking “objectivity” discourages questioning widely held 
assumptions or attempting to evaluate the extent to which arguments advanced by 
opposing sides are actually supported by evidence. The desire to appear detached, 
disinterested, and unbiased undermines the media’s “ability to discuss, deliberate on, and 
debate various perspectives in a manner that would move it toward consensus.”239  
 
The Contemporary Media Environment 
 Fast-forward to today. Network news, traditional newspapers, and journalists 
devoted to the norm of objectivity still exist. Even so, the Internet has disrupted the 
institutional media’s business model of old. With barriers to entry essentially eliminated, a 
whole host of partisan blogs, websites, and cable news programs have emerged. As with 
past bursts of innovation in communications technology, the very definition of “the media” 
has fundamentally shifted. The contemporary information environment now includes the 
detached, partisan, and social forms of media.240 
 Where are citizens getting their political information today? Of course, people still 
read newspapers;241 they still watch the evening news.242 But, more and more, they also 
listen to talk radio,243 watch cable (often partisan) news programs,244 and have access to an 
endless set of sources for political information on the Internet. Some get little political 
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information at all, opting instead to view any one of the nearly countless options for 
entertainment programming.245 
 In addition to the increasing number and type of news outlets, social media has 
fundamentally transformed not only how individuals consume, but also how they interact 
with political information. People no longer solely read, listen, or watch journalists present 
the news; increasingly, they “like,” “favorite,” “retweet,” share, reply to, comment on, and 
discuss the news with their “friends” and “followers” on Facebook and Twitter.246 Even in 
the two years since 2013, a significantly higher percentage of Facebook and Twitter users 
across nearly all demographic categories report getting news through social media.247 For 
Millennials, social media has become a particularly powerful source of news.248 According 
to the Pew Research Center, as of 2015, “one-in-ten U.S. adults get news on Twitter and 
about four-in-ten (41%) get news on Facebook.”249 These trends suggest that social media 
will continue to remake the media environment for years to come. 
 Writing before the full-scale emergence of social media, Markus Prior 
characterized contemporary American society, due to the explosion of choice in media 
outlets, as a “post-broadcast democracy”: 
 The differences between the media environments in 1935, 1970, and 2005 are 
 impossible to miss. Americans in 1935 had to wait for newspapers to be printed and 
 delivered if they wanted more than short radio news summaries. Newscasters and 
 politicians were right in the living room of many Americans in 1970 on a routine 
 basis, but they left at seven o’clock. For Americans in 2005, they stand by at every 
 hour of the day, ready to drop a mountain of information at the click of a mouse or 
 the push of a remote.250 
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It is a fact that the differences in the media environments of 1935, 1970, and 2005 are 
stark; but, with the rise of social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, even the 
media environment of 2005 is substantially distinct from that of 2015. 
 In this paper, I have largely followed those who endorse the deliberative conception 
of the role of the media in American democracy because, as far as ideals go, the dangers of 
setting the bar too high pale in comparison to those of setting it too low. Measured against 
this admittedly lofty ideal, how has the contemporary media—partisan, detached, and 
social—been doing? I’ll start by evaluating how recent trends in the media have influenced 
the tendency of affectively polarized partisans to engage in selective exposure. Next, I’ll 
assess the extent to which each form of media exacerbates (or perhaps mitigates) affective 
polarization—and thus, increases (or decreases) individuals’ susceptibility to eschew 
deliberation for motivated reasoning. 
 
Selective Exposure 
 In the heyday of detached journalism, the news was relatively successful in 
presenting multiple viewpoints. Although viewers and readers had little media choice, the 
journalistic standard of objectivity ensured that individuals would at least be exposed to the 
two major sides of any political argument. Of course, this was only the case so long as 
editors found an issue worthy of reporting. And the establishmentarian bias of these 
journalistic norms also meant that individuals did not have access to many minority 
perspectives. 
 Today, with no shortage of outlets representing both minority and majority 
perspectives, choice abounds; but this choice is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
access to infinitely diverse viewpoints provides the potential for much greater 
deliberation.251 On the other hand, choice makes the prospect of “echo chambers”—in 
which partisans only hear messages that constantly reinforce their prior attitudes—all the 
more likely.252 As Thomas Rosenstiel notes: 
 Influence is moving from the media producers as mediators and gatekeepers to 
 citizens functioning as their own editors. And citizens are having to change from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See Sunstein, Infotopia. 
252 See Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 
	   61	  
 merely passive consumers of media to pro-active assemblers of their own media 
 diet each day.253 
In constructing this media diet, people have more power to deliberate than ever before, but 
how are people using this power? Are people closing themselves off by engaging with only 
likeminded sources? Or are they opening themselves up to a diverse range of media 
outlets? 
 
The Partisan Media and Selective Exposure 
 As far as selective exposure is concerned, the partisan media bears the brunt of 
attacks from scholars and pundits alike. In her book, Niche News: The Politics of News 
Choice, Natalie Stroud demonstrates that partisans prefer likeminded partisan media 
sources. Party conventions and partisan films “attract likeminded audiences”254; ceteris 
paribis, partisans are more likely to read newspapers that endorse candidates of their own 
party255; “talk radio listeners tended to tune in to radio programs and hosts that matched 
their political beliefs”256; “partisans were more likely to use likeminded Web sites”257; and 
Republicans were much more likely to watch FOX News than were Democrats while 
Democrats were much more likely to watch MSNBC and CNN than were Republicans—
and this tendency has only increased over time.258 
 Partisan selective exposure is a real phenomenon. Some people have likely reacted 
to media fragmentation by closing themselves off from sources that challenge their 
worldview. But it is important not to overstate its impact on most viewers. Media 
fragmentation—and the partisan selective exposure that it makes possible—has not 
undermined the deliberative ideal by creating giant echo chambers. In fact, in the 
contemporary media environment, the most politically engaged citizens (even the highly 
partisan ones) experience exposure to more diverse sources than they did in the broadcast 
age.  
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 According to Nielsen data, heavy viewers259 spend an average of 72.4 minutes per 
day watching cable news. These same viewers spend a significant amount of time 
watching network news (31.6 minutes per day) and local news (21.8 minutes per day) too. 
Moreover, viewers of partisan media are not closing themselves off from the detached 
media: 82% of cable news viewers watch local news and 76% watch network news. Even 
more interesting, significant numbers of FOX News viewers watch MSNBC—and vice-
versa.260 With that said, there is still a sizable minority of cable news viewers who only 
watch one cable news source.261 Choice has allowed some to hear only confirmatory 
voices; however, given the significant overlap between viewers of cable, network, and 
local news and even the overlap between viewers of ideologically opposed cable programs, 
it would be a stretch to say that media fragmentation has fundamentally undermined the 
deliberative ideal as far as exposure is concerned. Many of the most active and partisan 
news consumers now have more diverse news exposure, not less. 
 
The Detached Media and Selective Exposure 
 Instead of increasing differences in partisans’ political information exposure, the 
largest effect media fragmentation has had on the American public has been to increase the 
differences between those who get political information and those who get little, if any at 
all. In other words, by allowing many Americans to select themselves out of news 
altogether in favor of entertainment options,262 the contemporary media environment 
undermines the deliberative ideal for information processing: many don’t bother to process 
any political information in the first place.  
 The explosion of entertainment programming has also had a deleterious effect on 
the detached media’s ability to encourage deliberation. Because of the intense competition 
that choice has brought to the media market, the institutional media talks less and less 
about political issues. Instead, there has been a marked increase in coverage of “soft 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Heavy viewers are those who view any one type of television news regularly. Pew Research Center, “How 
Americans Get TV News at Home.” 
260 28% of FOX News viewers also watch MSNBC while 34% of MSNBC viewers also watch FOX. 
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news,” which focuses on celebrities, developments in the entertainment industry, and 
human-interest stories that don’t have to do with issues of government or politics.263 
 
Social Media and Selective Exposure 
 How about social media? Greater and greater numbers of people now rely on 
Facebook and Twitter for their political information. Theoretically, the extent to which 
social media makes partisan selective exposure more or less likely depends on the 
algorithms that these sites employ and the heterogeneity of individuals’ social networks. If 
someone only has friends who share similar political beliefs, then social media can quickly 
turn into an echo chamber. But if one’s Facebook friends also include weak ties, then 
social media can be a powerful tool for diverse exposure. In fact, weak ties often provide 
novel information that leads to substantial knowledge gain.264 Fortunately, Facebook 
generally fosters networks that consist of both strong and weak ties. 265 And despite the fact 
that partisans self report that their friends on Facebook mostly post information consistent 
with their own beliefs,266 people see belief inconsistent information on social media more 
than they think they do.267  
 Solomon Messing and Sean J. Westwood conducted two experiments to measure 
whether social media tends to exacerbate or to mitigate partisan selective exposure. They 
provided participants in their study an interface like Facebook from which to select news 
articles. Then they manipulated the source associated with the article title as well as the 
number of Facebook members who had “liked” the article. Some participants saw the 
“source” cue alone with the article title. Some saw the “endorsement cue” (Facebook users 
liking the article). Some saw both. Messing and Westwood’s results are fascinating: they 
find that “stronger social endorsements increase the probability that people select content 
and that their presence reduces partisan selective exposure to levels indistinguishable from 
chance.”268 In the condition in which participants saw both the partisan and social 	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endorsement cues, they were 24% more likely than chance to select an article with many 
endorsements and 8% less likely than chance to select one with only a few. In other words, 
the fact that an article receives “likes” substantially mitigates the tendency of partisans to 
engage in selective exposure! 
 A growing body of empirical evidence substantiates the claim that social media use 
leads to diverse exposure to political information. Using Pew data, Yonghwan Kim found 
that use of social network sites is “positively related to exposure to cross-cutting points of 
view.”269 Furthermore, he observes that the effects of social network sites on diverse 
exposure did not depend on partisanship.270 Kim et al. demonstrate that how often people 
use social media positively predicts their discussion network heterogeneity and their civic 
engagement. Surprisingly, this effect was strongest for more introverted and less open-
minded individuals.271  
 Jennifer Brundidge argues that because the Internet allows individuals to transcend 
geographic boundaries; share “political perspectives through news comments, hyperlinks, 
and interactive communications technologies”; and form weak ties to people with whom 
they wouldn’t otherwise connect, it creates a space for exposure (if only inadvertently) to 
heterogeneous discussion networks.272 
 In sum, at least when it comes to the exposure requirement, the contemporary 
media environment does not present an existential threat to the deliberative ideal. While 
partisan cable programs might allow some people to tune out uncomfortable information, 
the evidence does not suggest that people sample news this way. Instead, the most active 
news consumers watch partisan as well as traditional television programs.  
 It is, however, concerning that so many people have used increased media choice to 
filter out politics altogether; but social media might provide a solution to this problem as 
well. Magdalena Wojcieszak and Diana Mutz find that online chat rooms and message 
boards facilitate crosscutting political interactions when politics comes up incidentally.273 
Utilizing national survey data, Kim et al. show that the Internet facilitates incidental news 	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exposure; however, they also find that the effects of this exposure on political participation 
were stronger for those who “consume less entertainment online.”274 Although the Internet 
in general may allow some to continue to select out of news, social media platforms, which 
mix social as well as political content from individuals’ networks, provide some hope of 
bringing the politically disengaged into the political process. 
 
Motivated Reasoning 
 Partisan selective exposure does not pose an enormous danger to the deliberative 
ideal. Does that mean that the media has been successful in promoting deliberation? 
Unfortunately, as should be evident from my discussion of motivated reasoning in chapter 
two, exposure to counter attitudinal information does not ensure deliberation; to the 
contrary, it often causes affectively charged partisans to dig in their heels. 
 In this section I’ll review how the partisan, detached, and social forms of media are 
doing when it comes to encouraging citizens to treat information in good faith. 
Maintaining an open mind requires respect for information sources beyond those that 
merely confirm one’s predispositions. In other words, for the media to promote 
deliberation, consumers need to trust it. Because affect leads individuals to engage in 
motivated reasoning, the media moves farther from the deliberative ideal when it facilitates 
affective polarization—and closer when it is able to mitigate it. Thus, assessing the extent 
to which the media encourages deliberation also necessitates asking which forms of media 
exacerbate affective polarization and which reduce it? 
 
The Impotency of the Detached Media: A Tale of Distrust 
 In the past decade alone, loads of fact-checking organizations have sprung up all 
across the United States—and the world for that matter.275 In theory, fact checking 
embodies what the media is supposed to be doing to encourage deliberation. Not only 
should it cause individuals to rethink statements made by their politicians, but it should 
also help set the parameters of political discourse pursuant to the deliberative ideal. Fishkin 
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and Luskin’s informed requirement comes to mind: Arguments need to be backed by 
“appropriate and reasonably accurate factual claims.”276  
 The problem lies in moving from theory to reality. Trust in the media is lower than 
it has ever been.277 And that mistrust diminishes the effectiveness of fact-checking. As 
Kyle Mattes and David Redlawsk argue “even as it engages in fact-checking, the media 
cannot act as a legitimate watchdog if those whom it serves do not trust it or perceive it as 
biased.”278 In other words, fact-checking only encourages deliberation if people care about 
substance not source.279 Unfortunately, that’s often not the case. Fact-checking is often 
seen as just another instance of the partisan weaponization of information. As Brendan 
Nyhan notes, “partisans who pay attention to politics are being conditioned to disregard the 
fact-checkers when their own side gets criticized.”280 
 Where did this widespread perception of media distrust come from? In his book, 
Why Americans Hate the Media and How it Matters, Jonathan M. Ladd provides evidence 
for two explanations. First, the news media’s tendency to cover tabloid-style stories—like 
the death of Anna Nicole Smith—causes Americans to rate the news media lower on a 
feeling thermometer. Second, a significant increase in criticism of the institutional media 
from politicians and elites on both the left and right has fostered media distrust.281 This 
mistrust means that the detached media is less effective in fulfilling its deliberative 
function: “those who distrust the press are more likely to resist new information that they 
attribute to the institutional media and seek additional information from more partisan 
sources. As a result, their beliefs tend to be less accurate and shaped more by 
partisanship.”282 
 Politicians have an incentive to turn citizens against the media. A weakened 
watchdog means that elected officials have more leeway to say and do what they want.283 
In his book, Attack the Messenger, Craig Crawford exhaustively documents how, since at 
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least 1988, politicians have avoided answering important questions by blaming the media 
for biased coverage instead. And now for fear of appearing biased, news organization 
seldom ask politicians the tough questions; instead of “tak[ing] the lead or stick[ing] with 
it when powerful politicians might be offended…they prefer to hide behind the charges of 
political opponents.”284 
  
Partisan Media and Affective Polarization 
 Because partisans generally don’t trust it, the institutional media has not been 
particularly successful at promoting deliberative information processing practices. But 
beyond being an ineffective tool for deliberation, does the media (particularly the partisan 
one) actually help push people away from the deliberative ideal? If, as I argued in chapter 
two, affect inspires motivated reasoning, then the media could move individuals farther 
from the deliberative ideal if its content infuses political leaders, issues, and ideas with 
more affect. Does the partisan media exacerbate or mitigate affective polarization? 
 Given that pundits of the partisan media routinely trade in outrage—“efforts to 
provoke emotional responses (e.g., anger, fear, moral indignation) from the audience 
through the use of overgeneralizations, sensationalism, misleading or patently inaccurate 
information, ad hominem attacks, and belittling ridicule of opponents”285—it is easy to 
imagine the partisan media as an affectively polarizing force. With the fragmentation of the 
media environment, and the end of the Fairness Doctrine, cable talk shows, radio shows, 
Internet blogs, and even newspaper columnists have found audiences for whom outrage 
sells.286 
 But does this type of outrageous, uncivil content affectively polarize viewers? For 
at least those who watch these programs, the answer seems to be yes. Diana Mutz 
conducted an experiment to test the effects of watching pundits engage in uncivil discourse 
on television. She found that “when uncivil discourse and close-up camera perspectives 
combine” for a type of “in-your-face” television, it actually “discourages the kind of 	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mutual respect that might sustain perceptions of a legitimate opposition.”287 Mutz’s result 
provides experimental evidence for the contention that uncivil, partisan news programming 
has the potential to increase negative affect towards the issues and people discussed. 
 Matthew Levendusky reports a similar finding. Not only do partisan shows on FOX 
News and MSNBC “attack the other side, highlight their flaws and foibles, and paint them 
as duplicitous and corrupt,” but they also “attack and criticize much of the effort to reach 
out and compromise.”288 Levendusky designed a number of experiments to test whether 
this type of presentation of information polarizes viewers. His results are consistent with 
both Mutz’s findings and the motivated reasoning hypothesis. Like-minded participants 
exposed to partisan programming showed attitude polarization (which lasted for several 
days!). When participants were forced to watch “cross-cutting” programming, their 
response depended on the strength of their initial beliefs. For those with strong priors, 
exposure actually caused them to express more extreme attitudes. For those with weak 
priors, exposure moderated their views.289 In terms of affect, “watching like-minded media 
makes viewers feel less affect for the other party, rate them less positively along a number 
of dimensions, have less support for bipartisanship, and have less trust in the other side to 
do what is right for the country.”290 
 Kevin Arceneaux and Martin Johnson find similar effects for partisan 
programming—at least for those who actual view them: “exposure to proattitudinal news 
can reinforce preexisting attitudes and cause people to be more resistant to opposing 
arguments.”291 But for a number of reasons they “doubt that partisan news shows are 
directly responsible for polarizing the mass public.”292 First, they argue that partisan media 
only reaches a limited number of people.293 Second, the people who self-select into 
watching these news programs are already polarized. Those who would have been most 
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affected by the partisan media—citizens with weak prior beliefs—have selected 
themselves out of partisan news in favor of entertainment programs.294 
 Arceneaux and Johnson’s results suggest that the emergence of partisan media 
cannot truly explain mass affective polarization while Levendusky’s suggest partisan 
media has a larger role in affectively polarizing the mass public. Additional research better 
substantiates Levendusky’s claim. Lelkes, Iyengar, and Sood provide perhaps the best 
evidence for a causal relationship between the rise of partisan media and mass affective 
polarization. Before 1996 (the year FOX News entered American political discourse), 
partisan television programming was virtually non-existent. Lelkes et al. exploit this fact. 
They demonstrate that access to FOX News affectively polarized politically interested 
Republicans; and when the Internet granted all politically active partisans access to more 
partisan programming both Democrats and Republicans showed effects of affective 
polarization.295 
 Lelkes et al.’s results are also consistent with a number of other studies. Lawrence, 
Sides, and Farrell show that partisans self-segregate in the blogosphere; and readers of 
right and left-wing blogs are nearly as polarized as members of Congress.296 Garrett et al., 
demonstrate that exposure to liberal and conservative news sites and blogs decrease net 
favorability toward out-party candidates and supporters.297  
 Most evidence indicates that the partisan media is a key determinant of affective 
polarization. But even in spite of the scholarly disagreement over the influence of partisan 
media on aggregate levels of affective polarization, partisan media at least tends to 
affectively polarize those who watch it. For the purpose of my discussion that is enough. 
Neither the detached nor the partisan media seems to be able to mitigate affective 
polarization, especially once viewers already have strong prior beliefs. For the former, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 They write: “if Americans are becoming more polarized, the rise of partisan media on cable television is 
not the likely culprit…while partisan news can polarize those who watch, the ample presence of 
entertainment programming likely mutes the overall effect of partisan media on mass attitudes.” Arceneaux 
and Johnson, Changing Minds or Changing Channels?, 88. 
295 “When Fox News was the primary source of ideological information, partisan animus was expressed 
mainly by Republicans, but as biased information of all slants became available, access to cable and attention 
to news increased affective polarization for all identifiers.” Lelkes, Iyengar, and Sood, “The Hostile 
Audience: Selective Exposure to Partisan Sources and Affective Polarization,” 27. 
296 Although the audience of right and left-wing blogs is relatively small, those who do read them tend to be 
the most politically active. Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell, “Self Segregation or Deliberation?” 
297 Garrett, Gvirsman, Johnson, Tsfati, Neo, and Dal, “Implications of Pro- and Counterattitudinal 
Information Exposure for Affective Polarization.” 
	   70	  
distrust of the media makes it ineffective at encouraging deliberation. For the latter, its 
inflammatory presentation of information further impassions an already affectively 
polarized audience, increasing each viewer’s tendency to engage in motivated reasoning. 
 
Social Media and Affective Polarization 
 Both traditional and non-traditional forms of media don’t appear to be effective in 
reducing political affect. In the case of partisan selective exposure, social media provided 
some hope. Is it possible that social media can also minimize the prospect of motivated 
reasoning by reducing affective polarization? 
 While there has been relatively little research on this front, an innovative study 
conducted by Pablo Barberá suggests social media may reduce mass political polarization. 
By estimating ideological ideal points for individual Twitter users based on the politicians, 
political parties, think tanks, and journalistic outlets they follow, Barberá is able to 
demonstrate the effects of network diversity on political moderation. He finds that over the 
course of a year and a half individuals’ ideal points moderated if their social networks 
were relatively diverse. Because social media generally encourages diverse networks—
through weak ties—Barberá’s results imply that social media can actually be a force for 
political moderation.298 
 There is even evidence that social media encourages individuals to both consider 
new political perspectives and change their mind based on that new information. In fact, 
even though most people use social media for primarily non-political purposes, “organic 
exposure to political diversity is taking place”—and crucially, this exposure has been 
shown to “stimulate persuasion.”299 
 The evidence reported thus far has implied a rather rosy view of social media as a 
force for depolarization. Unfortunately, not all the evidence in the literature supports this 
position. While Facebook and Twitter certainly expose Americans to much more diverse 
set of perspectives, Lee et al. find that those who frequently engage in political discussions 	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on Facebook and Twitter often end up more polarized from the experience. Social media—
at least Facebook and Twitter—cannot fully eliminate the all too human tendency to 
engage in motivated reasoning.300 Perhaps social media only succeeds in reducing affective 
polarization for those who use it passively for political information (i.e. getting 
information from news feeds rather than through interactions with others in the comment 
sections). When it comes time to personally undertake political discussions on these 
platforms, motivated reasoning trumps open-mindedness. In the next section of this 
chapter, I conduct a survey experiment to test whether or not passive encounters with 
political information prompt deliberation. 
 
Politicians vs. Peers 
 Does friendship inspire an open mind? That is, are people more open to considering 
novel arguments when they come from peers as opposed to politicians? A substantial 
literature supports the notion that source cues shape public opinion. For many issues, 
individuals often use partisan affiliation as a heuristic to determine their own positions. In 
fact, because “affective attachment to a political party is [often] acquired before issue 
preferences,” many Americans will support arguments—at least on most low salient 
issues—so long as their own party’s label appears next to it.301 Given, the rampant 
negative affect toward out-partisans in the American electorate, it should also not be 
surprising that a mere endorsement from a presidential candidate of the opposing party is 
enough to polarize opinions along partisan lines.302 
 While using source cues may be an effective shortcut to help voter become “fully 
informed” with minimal effort,303 retreating to partisan positions instead of engaging in 
thoughtful reflection directly violates a key tenet of the deliberative ideal: individuals must 
care about the substance of arguments advanced rather than “how they are made or who is 
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making them.”304 My discussion of motivated reasoning in chapter two suggests that 
negative affect for the out-party explains why Americans so often value source over 
substance. Using survey data gleaned from a representative sample of undergraduates at 
Bowdoin College, I test the peer-politician hypothesis: associating an idea with peers as 
opposed to an out-party politician induces open-mindedness. 305 
 
Data 
 My dataset consists of survey responses from 367 Bowdoin College students. 
Although college students are not a representative sample, they provide a better test of my 
hypothesis than would a sample of the public at large. First, college students tend to be 
more politically engaged than average citizens—precisely the segment of the American 
public on which this paper focuses. Second, my primary expectation—that people are more 
open-minded when they hear arguments from friends than from politicians—depends on 
the fact that each participant in the survey is part of the same, relatively small community. 
In other words, all participants in the study have the same “friends.” 
 Respondents in the study were presented with a brief, slightly modified excerpt 
from a Wall Street Journal opinion piece critical of Affirmative Action: 
 We live in a political environment where the intent of a policy aimed at helping 
 minorities is all that matters; questioning the policy’s actual effectiveness is 
 tantamount to racism. Our national debates about racial preferences tend to focus 
 on their legality, not whether they work as intended. Yet both are important. 
 
 An analysis of black students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 
 mid-1980s found that they had scored in the top 10% nationally on the math 
 portion of the SAT but in the bottom 10% among their classmates at MIT. As a 
 result, black students were dropping out at much higher rates, and those who didn’t 
 eave typically received lower grades than their white and Asian classmates. 
 Affirmative action had turned some of the smartest kids in the country into failures, 
 in a misguided effort to obtain some predetermined racial mix on the quad. 	  
 After racial preferences were banned in the University of California system in 
 1996, black enrollment at higher-ranked UCLA and Berkeley fell, but black 
 academic outcomes improved.306 
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While all participants saw the exact same excerpt, it was preceded by an introductory 
sentence that varied based on the condition to which the participant had been randomly 
assigned: either the “peer” or “politician” condition. In the “politician” condition, 
participants were asked, “We'd like your opinion of the following argument recently made 
by a Republican congressman on the issue of affirmative action in college admissions.” In 
the “peer” condition, participants were asked, “We'd like your opinion of the following 
argument recently made by a Bowdoin student in the Orient on the issue of affirmative 
action in college admissions.” 
 To measure how open-minded participants were in each condition, they were 
asked, “In trying to form the most accurate opinion possible on the issue of affirmative 
action, do you think it is worth taking the previous argument into consideration?” They 
were presented with the options, “Yes,” “No,” and “Not sure.” Note that this question did 
not ask whether the participant should accept the argument from the excerpt, only whether 
this individual should consider it. Considering alternative perspectives is crucial in any 
definition of deliberation.  
 
Results 
 Despite the fact that participants read the exact same argument on affirmative 
action, a much higher percentage of respondents in the “peer” condition reported a desire 
to consider the anti-affirmative action argument in forming their opinion. Overall, 66.5% 
of respondents in the peer condition expressed a willingness to consider the argument (N= 
115) compared with 54% in the politician condition (N=79). Running a one-tailed test 
confirms that the difference between the politician and peer condition is statistically 
significant using a 95% confidence interval. These results suggest that friends—at least 
relative to politicians—encourage greater deliberation. 
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 While this experimental manipulation can get at how open-minded individuals are 
when they hear arguments from friends rather than politicians, it has a couple significant 
limitations. First, the sample size of this dataset (N=367) is less than ideal. With such a 
small sample, any results that I report must be considered preliminary. Second, because of 
this small sample size, I was only able to have two experimental conditions. Had the 
survey been larger, I would have added a control condition, which presented the excerpt 
without an explicit source cue. Currently, the experiment can only show differences 
between peers and politicians. This makes any results difficult to interpret. On the one 
hand, it may be that any difference in participants’ willingness to consider the argument 
and to seek compromise implies that friendship inspires an open-mind. On the other hand, 
it may be that friendship is no different than a lack of any source cue; rather it is negative 
affect toward a politician that induces a closed mind. The literature suggests that both 
factors contribute to these results, but my experiment cannot reveal which factor is 
stronger or even that both are at play. 
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Conclusion 
 Does the contemporary media promote deliberation? Does it live up to the 
marketplace of ideas ideal? In terms of exposure, the contemporary media environment 
actually does relatively well. Most politically engaged Americans now see a much wider 
range of political perspectives than was once possible. These citizens often sample from 
partisan, detached, and social media sources. They often watch both liberal and 
conservative programming. 
 How this exposure affects individuals’ information processing practices is another 
story. In most cases of exposure to diverse opinions—from both the detached and partisan 
media—politically engaged citizens tend to polarize. Regardless of the form of media, 
motivated reasoning is a stubbornly persistent human psychological tendency. Although 
social media is no panacea, evidence for the effects of social media use on polarization is 
more mixed than for other forms of media. Perhaps there is some hope that it can promote 
deliberation.  
 As Barberá argues,  “individuals on one extreme of the ideological distribution may 
now discover that other members of their personal networks have completely different 
opinions, and therefore realize that holding such opinions is socially acceptable.”307 
Whereas a journalist from the detached media, who produces an “objective” report on a 
political issue, may evoke distrust, and a partisan journalist may even evoke hatred. It is 
possible that a “friend” may prompt respect, and ultimately an open-mind. 	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Where,	  when,	  how	  and	  for	  whom	  conscious	  processing	  will	  successfully	  override	  the	  
automatic	  intuitive	  response	  is	  the	  critical	  unanswered	  question	  that	  goes	  to	  the	  heart	  
of	  all	  discussions	  of	  human	  rationality	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  responsible	  electorate.	  
	  Milton	  Lodge	  and	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  Rationalizing	  Voter	  
 
Toward a Marketplace of Ideas 
 
 In Abrams v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. penned a legendary 
dissenting opinion. The court had just upheld the conviction of a group of Russian 
immigrants whose crime had been to circulate leaflets in support of the Russian 
Revolution. Criticizing the court’s disregard for the freedom of speech, Holmes invoked 
the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas: 
 When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
 come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
 conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
 that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
 competition of the market, and that truth, is the only ground upon which their 
 wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our 
 Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.308 
Holmes argued that if only the government respected First Amendment rights, truth would 
eventually emerge from the public discourse. But, it is worth asking, as Isaiah Berlin does, 
“Are demagogues and liars, scoundrels and blind fanatics, always, in liberal societies, 
stopped in time, or refuted in the end?”309 
 The preponderance of evidence presented in this paper suggests not. As American 
politics has become increasingly defined by affective polarization, as our political 
discourse has become progressively more partisan, and as the Information Age has given 
ideologues more ammunition to rationalize away uncomfortable arguments than ever 
before, the prospect of a marketplace of ideas has perhaps never seemed so remote. Given 
how fundamental and largely uncontrollable feelings are to information processing, it is 
not surprising that neither the detached, partisan, nor social forms of media (as they exist 	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today) can substantially mitigate the tendency of politically active partisans to engage in 
motivated reasoning. 
 So how can individuals form “better” beliefs? How can the media environment 
more accurately reflect a marketplace of ideas? How can American political discourse 
prioritize facts rather than the stale arguments of factions? Despite the pessimistic picture 
that this paper has painted, I conclude by arguing that we can move our sterile, partisan, 
and polarized political discourse in a more deliberative direction. This task requires 
rethinking how people approach political information and developing new technologies to 
make deliberation easier.  
 
Understanding Our Limits 
 In her book, Being Wrong, Kathryn Schulz makes a strong case for coming to terms 
with the limitations of human reason: “Of all the strife in the world…a staggering amount 
of it arises from the clash of mutually incompatible, entirely unshakable feelings of 
rightness.”310 At the core of this anti-deliberative behavior is the “tacit assumption that 
current belief is identical with true belief.”311 If our beliefs are “true” (as it often feels), 
then rather than seeking to learn from others, we will attempt to proselytize them; rather 
than listening to opposing perspectives, we will “reason” them away. After all, when you 
are right, why bother considering what others have to say? 
 This approach to belief formation makes little sense, however, when one considers 
a crucial question: On what are our political opinions actually based? Chapter two suggests 
that they are no more than feelings (often unconscious) developed as a result of a lifetime 
of rather arbitrary exposure to information and dependent on the congruence of that 
information with our social or partisan identities. Each of us has a severely limited working 
memory.312 Ideas that do make it into long-term memory are tinged with affect.313 When 
we try to bring arguments to the front of our minds, they are systematically biased by 
affect contagion—and are little more than mere rationalizations for how we feel about an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Schulz, Being Wrong, 8. 
311 Ibid., 21. 
312 Miller, “The magical number seven, plus or minus two.” 
313 Lodge and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter, 60. 
	   78	  
issue.314 These limitations make motivated reasoning in the realm of affectively polarized 
politics virtually inevitable. 
 Nonetheless, if there’s any hope of approximating the deliberative ideal, then each 
of us must attempt to consciously recognize our own partisan biases. We must understand 
that even when we try our best to be deliberative, affect unconsciously dominates all stages 
of our thought processes—from the very memories we can call to mind to the arguments 
that we find inherently persuasive.315 Perhaps if we appreciate the role that affect plays in 
our “reasoning,” then we might choose to take steps to counteract its effects: maybe that 
means avoiding inflammatory information sources; going out of our way to learn from 
others rather than trying to convert them to our own position; or just living with a healthy 
amount of self-doubt. As Cass Sunstein argues, a “strong norm in favor of critical thinking 
can reduce some of the most damaging pressures, and hence ensure that people will hear 
from many minds rather than a few.”316 
 Although a strong norm in favor of critical thinking would certainty make each of 
us relatively more deliberative, it is a fairly unsatisfying solution to the problem of 
motivated reasoning—much of which occurs as a result of forces outside of conscious 
control! Can we do better? 
 
A Deliberative Social Media Platform 
 Henry Hazlitt quips, “eternal vigilance is the price of an open mind.”317 But 
perhaps if the cost of open-mindedness weren’t so steep, ideological, dogmatic, and 
emotional convictions would not substitute for deliberate thought quite so often. What if 
the price of an open mind weren’t “eternal vigilance” but instead a moderate amount of 
engagement with political information and a whole lot of teamwork? Chapter three 
demonstrated that social media does marginally better than the partisan or detached forms 
of media at overcoming motivated reasoning; however, none of these platforms (e.g. 
Facebook, Twitter) were designed with human psychology and deliberation in mind. 
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 In his book, Respecting Truth: Willful Ignorance in the Internet Age, Lee McIntyre 
points to two technologically related “sources of hope” for discovering truth in the 
Information Age: Wikipedia and social media, specifically Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube. Wikipedia is striking for its relatively accurate, voluminously expansive, and 
consistently up-to-date entries on nearly every subject. The key to Wikipedia’s success lies 
in the concept of crowdsourcing: “the idea that mass scrutiny of errors in an open forum is 
a powerful way to create knowledge, and may even be the best way to reach toward 
truth.”318 In fact, the process of crowdsourcing—at least as it is implemented in 
Wikipedia—reflects a type of mass mediated deliberation: 
 Wikipedia is in part a deliberative forum, with reason-giving by those who disagree 
 and with deliberative “places” to accompany disagreement. In fact, every 
 page…includes an accompanying “talk” page. This means that every entry in the 
 encyclopedia can be used as a deliberative space—and many entries are so used.319 
Thus, the page for any given Wikipedia entry reflects the, albeit imperfect,320 result of 
deliberation between its many editors. While Wikipedia serves as an easily accessible and 
reasonably reliable source of information for virtually any subject, it does not directly 
induce its readers to engage in deliberation. Social media, however, provides a more direct 
outlet for its users to deliberate about politics. 
 As chapter three reported, Americans are increasingly using social media—
Facebook and Twitter in particular—for consuming political news. These platforms 
provide spaces for users to discuss (in the form of “comments” on Facebook and “replies” 
on Twitter) this news with other members of their personal networks and beyond. These 
platforms make diverse exposure to information more likely: “the openness and 
widespread availability of social media enables the sort of information dissemination that 
is crucial to keep from living in an information cocoon.”321 And as my small survey 
experiment from chapter three suggests, getting information from friends (at least 
passively) rather than from politicians prompts more open-mindedness. 	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 While social media does better than the partisan or the detached media in 
promoting deliberation, current platforms encourage deliberation only incidentally. When 
partisans actively engage in discussions on these sites, motivated reasoning remains a 
powerful force as users end up more polarized than when they started.322 Using the 
principle of crowdsourcing, can a novel social media platform be designed to work around 
the limitations of the human mind? 
 Recall that much of the impetus for motivated reasoning stems from the meager 
capacity of working memory and the biases in multiple stages of information processing 
that affect inspires. Our cognitive limitations make properly reevaluating our conclusions 
practically impossible: “Once a judgment is reached, much of the information that 
contributes to it is disgorged. The judgment is retained but most of the raw material that 
went into it is not.”323 Because we can’t keep track of the initial reasons that went into 
forming our original beliefs, it becomes impossible to deliberately weigh new information 
against old. Instead, we rely on feelings. As Milton Lodge and Charles Taber put it: 
 Rather than treating information about political parties, candidates, or issues 
 evenhandedly, as normative models of rational decision making prescribe, citizens 
 are prone to accept those facts and arguments they agree with and discount or 
 actively counterargue those that challenge their preconvictions, where agreement or 
 disagreement is marked by the feelings that are automatically triggered in the 
 earliest stages of thinking about the issues. In short, citizens are often partisan in 
 their political information processing, motivated more by their desire to maintain 
 prior beliefs and feelings than by their desire to make “accurate” or otherwise 
 optimal decisions.324 
But what if a social media platform enabled users to construct, visualize, save, and easily 
update their beliefs—and crucially, the reasons and evidence that went into forming them 
in the first place? In other words, what if individuals could overcome the limits of working 
and long-term memory by outsourcing much of the belief formation process to the 
platform itself? 
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 Hypothetically, here is how such a platform might work. First and foremost, 
information must exist in a standardized format amenable to constructing, visualizing, and 
updating one’s own beliefs. Currently, we assimilate new information into our beliefs 
rather passively and arbitrarily: read a news article, watch a television segment, talk with a 
friend about politics, etc. To construct and visualize our beliefs, it must be easy to 
compare, contrast, and save the arguments and evidence advanced in that news article, 
journal article, television segment, or other source of political information. Reformatting 
this information might just mean summarizing it by pulling out the central arguments and 
evidence advanced.  
 Crowdsourcing would make it possible to reformat vast volumes of information 
into an agreed upon structure. And these new structures could be compared, combined, and 
reconstructed to allow users of the platform to create and save their beliefs to their personal 
pages. Users would be able to see the arguments and evidence that went into forming those 
beliefs. And beliefs would need to be substantiated by facts and data rather than just 
emotional conviction. In some sense, breaking down information into their fundamental 
logical units of analysis on a massive scale would create a type of marketplace of ideas in 
which crowdsourcing generates the currency for deliberation: arguments and evidence. 
 Once information is repackaged, individuals could pull arguments and evidence 
from across the platform to deliberate about a given issue. Users would be able to compare 
arguments with counterarguments from a wide variety of sources—and then construct 
more nuanced ones based on all the relevant evidence that they could find.  
 Being able to save and visualize one’s own beliefs provides a number of 
deliberative benefits. For one, the social media platform, because it would be able to keep 
track of what arguments and evidence a user considered in forming a given belief, would 
be able to suggest arguments and evidence important to many others on the platform but 
that this user had not previously considered in forming his belief. Rather than affect 
contagion determining the information that individuals consider in forming their beliefs, an 
algorithm would. 
 In addition, easily being able to see the reasons that went into forming a given 
belief would allow a user’s “friends” to easily critique—and thus help improve—it. Instead 
of discussions based on the typical comment sections structure of platforms like Facebook 
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and Twitter, users could engage in discussions with their friends that are narrowly focused 
on a given argument or piece of evidence—and because this platform would also function 
as a massive database of arguments and evidence from many sources, these discussions 
could be rooted in facts rather than mere opinion. In short, this would allow individuals to 
question every argument and piece of evidence that went into forming their own beliefs 
and that of their friends (or even politicians). User interactions would reflect a type of 
Socratic dialogue rather than a chaotic stream of consciousness. 
 Beyond the average individual, one could also imagine democratic benefits 
associated with politicians and other elites publically having to construct, visualize, and 
update their beliefs on this platform—and support those beliefs with evidence! Users 
would be able to see the reasons that went into a given politician’s position. They could 
create discussions questioning those reasons. And the platform itself could point out 
arguments and evidence that a politician had failed to consider in forming their beliefs. 
Ideally, this would force politicians to recognize the tradeoffs necessitated by their 
positions, acknowledge the value in the arguments of others, and ultimately, root their 
beliefs in facts rather than relying on the talking points of their respective factions. This 
social media platform would incentivize “the political classes [to] jointly search for truth” 
rather than give them more “weapons with which to club [their] opposition.”325 
 
Conclusion 
 Passion has likely always polarized politics to some degree. There is nothing 
fundamentally new about humans engaging in motivated reasoning. And it is not surprising 
that ambitious politicians take advantage of this fact: if they are able to “[divide] mankind 
into parties, [inflame] them with mutual animosity, and [render] them much more disposed 
to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good,”326 then they can 
more easily keep power. 
 In the contemporary information and political environment, mutual antipathy for 
members and leaders of the opposing party had deteriorated the quality of American 
political discourse. The Information Age has blessed individuals with access to more data, 	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and more perspectives than ever before; however, this wealth of information can often 
seem more like a curse than a blessing. Neither the detached, partisan, nor social form of 
media has been able to foster deliberation.  
 Despite these pessimistic pronouncements, it is as important as ever to find a way 
to harness the immense power of the Information Age in service of deliberation. As Robert 
Schmuhl and Robert G. Picard write: 
 For the marketplace of ideas to continue to have symbolic power and meaning in 
 the modern communications environment of multiple media and messages without 
 end, the lone, searching individual will need to discover, in a consciously 
 deliberative way, the ideas and information that approximate the truth, from the 
 perspective of a citizen-seeker. That concept, in itself, might seem unrealistic—and 
 almost as idealistic as the metaphor Holmes introduced—but it is what our 
 experimental and imperfect times require.327 
Despite all of the challenges presented in this paper, we can take steps to make the 
“unrealistic,” “idealistic” vision of a marketplace of ideas a reality. The first step is to 
recognize the limits of our own minds. The second is to reimagine the tools at our disposal 
for processing information. The Information Age is currently defined by partisan 
polarization. Perhaps with a little more innovation it might become “a new Socratic age”328 
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Data Appendix I 
Data Gathering Procedure 
 In order to get Twitter data for each member of the 114th Congress, I created a 
Python dictionary,329 which associated each MC with their Twitter handle. GovTrack 
provides an API that give access to this information. Next, I wrote a Python script to get 
this data from GovTrack. I discovered a few errors in GovTrack’s list: some Twitter 
handles were incorrect and others were non-existent. After crosschecking the resulting list 
of MCs against the official lists of the 114th Senate and House by hand, I manually filled in 
the rest of the missing data. In a few cases, MCs appeared to have more than one Twitter 
account. When that was the case, I chose the Twitter handle that, upon closer inspection, 
seemed most closely affiliated with the MCs official office (rather than their campaign). 
Only two House members did not have Twitter accounts—Charlie Dent (D-PA) and Rob 
Bishop (R-UT). 
 Like GovTrack, Twitter provides a relatively straightforward API. In order to 
access this API, I modified a version of a Python script that I found on GitHub330 to scrape 
Twitter for each MC’s tweets. This procedure allowed me to get every tweet that an MC 
has sent starting from February 9, 2016 and moving backward in time (up to approximately 
3200 tweets for each MC)—the earliest tweet in the dataset is from February 15, 2008. 
 After scraping Twitter for these tweets, I filtered the data set to capture just tweets 
explicitly mentioning one or both of the political parties (or bipartisanship). The keyword 
dictionary that I constructed to filter these tweets contained the following words (not case-
sensitive): “Democrat,” “Democrats,” “Dem,” “Liberal,” “Democratic,” “Republican,” 
“Republicans,” “GOP,” “Conservative,” “Repub,” “Repubs,” “Bipartisan,” and 
“Bipartisanship.” 112, 367 tweets contained one or more of these keywords. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 My dataset contains Twitter data for 533 MCs—though DW-NOMINATE data was 
only available for 443. Figure 6 reflects the distribution of partisan tweeting. Figure 7 	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shows the correlation between the key explanatory variable (a MC’s ideological extremity) 
and the dependent variable (the proportion of a MC’s tweets that fall into the partisan 
category). Figure 8 shows the same relationship instead broken down based on the MC’s 
chamber of Congress. Table 2 contains the multivariate regression results for Models 2a-
2d, which test the bipartisan tweeting hypothesis. 
 For most MCs, approximate 2-5% of their tweets fall into the partisan category. 
There are a significant number of MCs around 5-7% and a few MCs who engage in 
partisan tweeting more than 7% of the time. Again, because this data relies on only explicit 
mentions of the party to categorize partisan statements, it likely understates the true 
proportion of MCs tweets that are partisan in nature. 
Figure 6: Distribution of Partisan Tweeting 
 
 Figure 7 shows the raw data for partisan tweeting, plotting an MC’s DW-
NOMINATE Distance (from zero) along the x-axis. In line with the regression results 
reported in chapter one, increasingly extreme MCs tend to engage in more partisan 
tweeting, and this effect tails off after a DW-NOMINATE Distance of around 0.5. It is 
interesting that there are a few outliers who engage in relatively low levels of partisan 
tweeting even though they have very extreme DW-NOMINATE Distances. 
 I hypothesize that the distribution tails off slightly at high levels of extremity 
because MCs at that level of extremity may be less likely to praise their own party. Recall 
that “partisan” tweets consist of both negative statements about the opposing party and 
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positive statements about the MC’s party. For example, Senator Mike Lee, who is depicted 
by the dot with the highest DW-NOMINATE Distance, makes negative statements about 
the Democratic Party in about 2.2% of his tweets. By comparison, he makes positive 
statements about the Republican Party only in 1.1% of his tweets. In fact, he even criticizes 
his own party more than he praises it: around 1.6% of his tweets are anti-Republican. This 
example, however, is only suggestive of an explanation, more systematic analysis must be 
undertaken to truly explain the outliers in the distribution—and that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Figure 7: Ideological Extremity and Partisan Tweeting (Correlation) 
 
 Breaking down this data based on a MC’s chamber of Congress also visually 
demonstrates what the regression results from this chapter indicate: members of the House 
are more partisan in their tweeting than are members of the Senate. 
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Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of the Bipartisan Tweeting Hypothesis (OLS) 
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Adjusted R2 0.1132 0.1134 0.1144 0.1136 
N 443 443 443 443 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 	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